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Hungary After the Revolution:
Privatization, Economic Ideology
and the False Promise of the
Free Market
Kent Klaudt*
What's the worst thing about communism? What comes after.
- Hungarian saying
Introduction
The five year anniversary of revolution in Eastern Europe' is
now past, yet throughout the former Soviet bloc there is widespread
disappointment with the fruits of that sweeping change. The path
to a market economy is creating poverty,2 unemployment, and enor-
* B.A., Political Science, University of Minnesota, 1991; J.D., University of
Minnesota, expected 1996. The author lived in Hungary in 1993. This article is
dedicated to Barbara Plantiko, and to William and Dolores Klaudt. I am indebted to
Maureen Cavanaugh, Amy Hermanek, Chris Keller, Kraig Klaudt, Chris Lee, Ste-
phen J. Miller, and Celeste Taylor for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
article. I am also indebted to Marci Hoffman, Dave Holtan, and Monika Juhasz-
Nagy for their assistance in my research.
1. I use the term Eastern Europe to refer to these European former state social-
ist countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, but not that part of Germany which was East Germany, due to its unique
development situation. Other authors sometimes refer to "Central Europe" or "East-
Central Europe" when discussing Hungary.
2. While a few fortunate entrepreneurs (including much of the old communist
elite) are thriving in the new free market structures, unemployment, poverty, and a
grave fear of the future are now persistent conditions for many Hungarians. In Hun-
gary, as in the other countries of the region, it has become obvious that while a
western-style economy can slowly be built in the aftermath of state socialism, it will
not benefit most of the population. This fact has been documented extensively in the
last two to three years. "The collapse of the Soviet-style command economy created a
new class of brash capitalists brandishing cellular telephones as they cruise bumpy
highways in sleek new cars. But it also instigated a downward economic spiral shov-
ing millions.., below the poverty line in a repetition of the inequalities that contrib-
uted to the rise of socialism and extreme nationalism here [Hungary] before World
War II." John Pomfret, Millions Below Poverty Line Ambivalent About Benefits of
Capitalism, WASH. PosT., Oct. 25, 1994, at A13. "Amid the glitter of unbridled capi-
talism, however, one can also find a seamier side - huge pockets of poverty, unem-
ployment, corruption, crime." Ron Chepesiuk, The Bloom is Off the Rose, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMEs, Jan. 2, 1994, at 1D. "The income of 66 percent of Hungarians
has significantly fallen in the past few years... " Wages Plummeting, BUDAPEST
WI-, Dec. 15-21, 1994, at 4. "[Clertain people [in Hungary] are accumulating a lot of
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mous economic uncertainty on a scale unknown in this region until
the birth of radical economic reform in 1989.3
In Hungary, the primary effect of post-1989 statutory changes
introducing a market economy is the creation of massive inequal-
ity,4 and the "collapse of civil order unlike anything the country has
experienced in modem times."5 This trend is unlikely to be re-
versed in the near future, and will ultimately become entrenched if
current policies are not revised.6 Andras Inotai, the head of the In-
stitute for World Economics at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences,
described the overall process:
For the first time in history, these [Eastern European] econo-
mies became a laboratory for simple or simplified economic ide-
ologies based on models that had previously existed only in
university textbooks and which, fortunately, had never been
applied in any full-fledged market economy... [T]he results of
applying the Western patterns of transformation have become
capital, while the majority of the population is not as well off as it was before." Carol
Williams, Tough Times; The Rapid Pace of Change in the Wake of Communism's
Collapse has Fueled Fear, Anger and Disappointment, LA. TIMEs, Apr. 14, 1992,
World Report, at 2. "[The newborn capitalism brought unemployment, poverty and
dramatic social and ethnic tensions to Eastern Europe - while it didn't change the
weather." Mildos Vamos, Kicking the Tires in Hungary, NATION, Oct. 29, 1990, at
487.
3. See infra notes 150, 158, 165, 166, 176-180 and accompanying text.
4. After five years of reform, the situation is so extreme that ten percent of the
population accounts for one half of consumer spending in the country. Frank Vivi-
ano, Eastern Europe's Lost Generation: Historic Change Brings Alienation Instead of
Hope, S.F. CHRON., Sep. 19, 1994, at Al. "[W]ithin all six East European countries, a
chasm has opened up between a tiny number of nouveau riche and a growing popula-
tion of abysmally poor..." Kitty McKinsey, East Europe's New Order; Western-style
Economy Contrasts with the Third World Poverty, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Nov. 5, 1994, at
B7. "'Some Hungarians became rich under the new system, but the homeless began
appearing in the streets, as well. There's more concern for money than for people
now,' complained a 19-year-old student who voted Socialist." Linnet Myers, Eco-
nomic Distress Boosts Hungary's Socialists to Election Victory, Cm. TRm., May 9,
1994, at 6, zone N. "Their societies [Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary] have
been divided into two classes: the envied few who, despite some rough going, have
profited from the change and a resentful majority upset at not being able to make it."
Jane Perlez, Fast and Slow Lanes on the Capitalist Road, N.Y. Tnms, Oct. 7, 1994,
at Al. "Five percent of Hungarians are now extremely rich by any standards. How-
ever, fully a quarter of the population hovers around the poverty line of 9,000 forints
($129) a month, a third of the average wage." Kitty McKinsey, Hungary: Gap Be-
tween the Rich and Poor Widens to Chasm in Policy Vacuum, OTTAWA CrrizEN, Nov.
15, 1993, at D10. See generally Barbara Sierszula, The New Capitalism's Capital-
ists: Rags to Riches in Hungary, WORLD PREss REv., Feb., 1994, at 14-17. Public
opinion surveys show that a large majority of Hungarians believe that inequality has
increased dramatically since the introduction of free market reforms. M.D.R. Evans,
Jonathan Kelley, and Tdmas Kolosi, Images of Class: Public Perceptions in Hungary
and Australia, 57 Am. Soc. Rev. 461, 470. See also infra notes 180-183.
5. Frank Viviano, Old Enemies Join Forces in Hungary; Communists Back in
Power as Crime Soars, Economy Dives, S.F.CHRON., Sept. 5, 1994, at Al [hereinafter
Old Enemies].
6. See infra part V.
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increasingly ambiguous. Although curing some ills, at least
temporarily and superficially, they have caused or aggravated
crises in several other areas. 7
The central elements of this overall process are privatizationS and
foreign investment, practices that are intimately connected. 9
This article examines Hungary as a case study in the post-
1989 revolutionary process in Eastern Europe. It explains how the
transition to a market economy is taking place, how this transition
has "caused or aggravated crises"10 in Hungary, and why this tran-
sition will continue to fail into the long-term future. Part I outlines
the laws important to the creation of a free market economy: first,
the reforms of the socialist state, as they are often the backdrop and
basis of recent reforms; and, second, the significant post-socialist
laws. Part II argues that the post-1989 revolutionary project is a
disaster that has almost entirely ignored the human costs of transi-
tion. The emerging capitalist relations of production,"1 created
through privatization and foreign investment, are producing a
small and wealthy entrepreneurial/technocratic upper class while
impoverishing most of the population more thoroughly than did the
preceding communist system. Part III examines why the failed
strategies of the past five years have not been abandoned. This sec-
tion will show that free market ideology, western aid policies, the
7. Andras Inotai, Transforming the East: Western Illusions and Strategies,
HUNGARLAN Q., (1992) at 24. These other areas are, inter alia, employment, real
wage levels, health care, crime, and social welfare. See also infra part II.
8. "Privatization is the opposite of nationalization: privatization of state enter-
prises reflects the predominance of capitalist thinking, whereas nationalization is an
obvious sign of socialist development... " Andrei A. Baev, Civil Law and the Trans-
formation of State Property in Post-Socialist Economies: Alternatives to Privatiza-
tion, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 131, 134 (1993). It is a "process of socio-economic
transformation of the foundation of socialist centralized economies by means of
transferring state assets and state enterprises to the private sector and thereby re-
sulting in fundamental changes in ownership relationships in the spheres of produc-
tion and distribution of material welfare." Id. at 150. See also Ira W. Lieberman,
Privatization: The Theme of the 1990s, 28 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 8 (1992) (discuss-
ing the global importance and relevance of privatization).
9. Zsigmond Jgrai, 10 Per Cent Already Sold: Privatization in Hungary, in
HuNcARY: AN ECONOMY IN TRANsrION 77, 80 (Istvdn P. Sz6kely and David M.G.
Newbery, eds., 1993). I will suggest later in this article that these two processes can
exist independently of each other, and that the privatization process ought to be re-
conceptualized and implemented in the absence of significant foreign capital.
10. Inotai, supra note 7.
11. Production relations, for purposes of this article, means the way society is
organized for the production of goods and services. It includes the nature of owner-
ship, control of productive resources and production decisions, and the distribution
of decision-making power between workers, managers, owners, and the public at
large. See also ROGER SCRUTON, A DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL THOuGHT 378 (1982)
("Marxian-influenced term for the relations between people in production, and be-
tween people and productive forces, which are enshrined in laws of property, and
which define the base structure of society").
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International Monetary Fund, and the agenda of Hungarian elites
concertedly enforce the privatization and foreign investment re-
gimes on the Hungarian population, although these policies are the
demonstrable cause of enormous material inequality and poverty.
Part IV argues that Hungary, in its attempt to catch up to the
West, should reject its current development path. The growth of
poverty and inequality in society will continue into the long-term
future unless a different development model is adopted. Finally,
Part V suggests that privatization through worker ownership is a
realistic alternative to the traditional capitalist model of investor
ownership emerging in Eastern Europe. This alternate organizing
principle emphasizes the importance of economic democracy, not
just political democracy. It is preferable for Hungary because it is
more reflective of majoritarian desires for social justice in the tran-
sition process.
Why study Hungary? There are other East European coun-
tries in which the transition to a market economy has been more
condensed temporally and more profound in its effects. Romania
and the Czech Republic, for instance, are more illustrative of the
radical nature of the recent transformations in the former Soviet
bloc because prior to 1989 those countries had virtually no market
elements in their economies. 12 For several reasons, however, Hun-
gary was the natural candidate for successfully re-creating itself as
a free market economy. It was the wealthiest country in Eastern
Europe before the Berlin Wall came down. It was the only member
of the Soviet bloc, except East Germany and arguably the Czech
Republic, with substantial historical ties to the West. It had also
been experimenting with marketization since 1968.13 Hungary, in
terms of its "progress" toward a market economy, was far ahead of
its Soviet bloc neighbors when its socialist government fell in 1989.
12. Roger W. Mastalir, Regulation of Competition in the New Free Markets of
Eastern Europe: A Comparative Study of Antitrust Laws in Poland, Hungary, Czech
and Slovak Republics, and Their Models, 19 N.C.J. INT'L. L. & Comm. REG. 61,80-81
(1993). "By late 1990, just before passage of the Czechoslovakian law on competi-
tion, Czechoslovakia had almost no private sector at all." Id.
13. This is the year the New Economic Mechanism was introduced. The time
period of 1968 to 1989 is commonly referred to as "goulash communism" or "goulash
capitalism," depending on the source. Either way, it means a series of reforms liber-
alizing the economy through decentralization of production decisions, and the lim-
ited introduction of private property, private enterprise, and foreign investment.
The Hungarians began to connect themselves more and more with Western Euro-
pean and world economic institutions during this time. See Anthony R. Boote and
Jdnos Somogyi, Economic Reform in Hungary Since 1968, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND OCCASIONAL PAPER 83 (July 1991). The New Economic Mechanism continued
centralized planning, but eliminated rigid production targets for state-owned enter-
prises. In place of production targets, incentives were created in the form of credits,
prices and taxes in order to induce compliance with national goals. Id. at 1-2.
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By that time, Hungary's economy had already taken substantial
steps down the path to capitalism.14 A study of the failure of mar-
ket reform in Hungary, therefore, may best support the general
proposition that the new market reforms (as currently applied) will
fail throughout Eastern Europe and irreparably damage these soci-
eties. In other words, if the Hungarians can't do it, then the rest of
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics probably can't do
it. 15
I. Economic Laws
(a) Background and Economic Laws under State
Socialism
Privatization and foreign investment are the essence of the
project of transforming Hungary into a capitalist market econ-
omy.16 The legal structures that promote radical privatization17
and foreign investment are important components of this transfor-
mation.1 8 These laws, therefore, will be described here in detail.
14. See infra part I(a).
15. "As a leader in the restructuring, Hungary's experience can be expected to be
a precursor of outcomes in other formerly centrally planned countries." Sarah J.
Lane, The Pattern of Foreign Direct Investment and Joint Ventures in Hungary, 6
COMMUNIST ECON. & ECON. TRANSFORMATION 341, 362 (1994). The whole process of
turning economically developed socialist countries into market economies is sui
generis. This process had not happened anywhere before 1989. Later in this article,
I will suggest that, in light of this fact, already doubtful textbook liberal economic
theory ought to be scrutinized more closely before it is applied to reality as a pre-
scription for Eastern European economic development. See also Csaba Varga,
Transformation to Rule of Law from No-Law: Societal Contexture of the Democratic
Transition in Central and Eastern Europe, 8 CONN. J. Ie'L L. 487, 488 (1993) (dis-
cussing this transformation in the context of constitutional and legal reform).
16. See JAN KREGEL ET AL., THE MARKET SHOCK, 15 (1992) (describing the impor-
tance of these two events).
17. The economic transformation, was, in fact, quite radical in Hungary. "The
transition in Hungary was not gradual because earlier reforms failed to resolve basic
problems. Therefore it was in fact a hidden shock therapy." Gabor Bakos, Hun-
garian Transition After Three Years, 46 EuROPE-AsiA STUDms 1189, 1193 (1994).
Only if viewed in relation to its state socialist neighbors, however, can it be said that
privatization has been a gradual process in Hungary.
18. The legal system plays a vital role in creating capitalist societies. Eastern
Europe is no exception, and these societies are using the law as an instrument of
economic reform.
Capitalist property and contractual relations thrived in countries
where the process of law-making, as well as the interpretation and ap-
plication of law, became more predictable, reliable and responsive to
capitalist interests. The essence of capitalist investment is the ability
of individuals and companies to plan ahead, assume and rely upon con-
tractually formulated commitments in a legal, fiscal, institutional and
regulatory environment that is as predictable and stable as possible.
Without ownership created, recognised and protected by law, no trade
increasing the utility of seller and buyer can take place. Ownership
1995]
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The legal system in Hungary, as everywhere, exists primarily to
legitimize and articulate the economic and political policies of the
state.19 This is not to say that a system of laws will never take on a
life of its own. Neither does it deny that there are sometimes
symbiotic relationships between the legal system and the economic
and political structure of society. However, only five years into the
creation of a new government and legal regime, it is hard to see
what the lasting effects of the lawper se will be. Instead, it is easier
to analyze the effects of economic policies because they are more
explicit and immediately observable.
The legal environment in the final years of state socialism
must be understood to make sense of recent legal reforms. The de-
fining legal concepts of property and contract in Hungary were codi-
fied in the Civil Code of 1959, which identified three types of
property: private property, personal property, and social property.
Private property was the least favored in the law, although it was
recognized and protected to some extent.20 The civil code limited
the holding and use of private property, and a law that forbade the
employment of more than five persons in a private business se-
verely limited private economic activity. This, of course, was re-
defines the relation of persons - natural or juridical - to goods, tangible
or intangible. The third fundamental building block is company law...
Thomas W. Waelde and James L. Gunderson, Legislative Reform in Transition Econ-
omies. Western Transplants - A Short-Cut to Social Market Economy Status?, 43
INTL. & COMP. L.Q. 347, 351-53 (1994). Production relations characterized by the
private ownership and control of productive forces, along with opportunities for in-
vestment of capital, are the sine qua non of capitalism. Id. This section will there-
fore concentrate on laws regulating the privatization process and foreign direct
investment.
19. I posit as a general rule that economic decisions per se do not exist. All eco-
nomic decisions are political decisions, as well, because they necessarily involve
power and the distribution of scarce resources in society. I say "economic and polit-
ical policies" only to separate analytically those which are almost purely political, for
example, obscenity laws or freedom of religion laws, and I follow John Elliott's view
of the character of economic decision-making:
[Ilssues of equity and social justice are built into the very fabric of eco-
nomic life; they do not arise merely as ethical judgments added exoge-
nously so to speak purely to economic analyses. Second, the economy
itself, not only the state and public policy, is inherently political. There-
fore, determination of wise decisions in relation to such matters as un-
employment, depression, equality, and poverty are properly rooted in
political philosophy as well as technical economic analysis... The econ-
omy itself is a political system because power and wealth are inextrica-
bly connected.
John E. Elliott, Challenges Facing Social Economics in the Twenty-First Century: A
Radical Democratic Perspective, REv. Soc. EcON., Dec. 22, 1993, at 504.
20. Cheryl W. Gray et al., Hungarian Legal Reform for the Private Sector, 26
GEO. WASH. J. IN'L L. & ECON. 294, 303-04 (1992). Three types of property were
recognized in the socialist state: social or cooperative property (owned or controlled
by the state), personal property (homes, furniture, clothing, etc.), and private prop-
erty (individually-owned means of production). Id.
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lated to the goal of state socialism, which used central government
planning as the primary redistributive mechanism in society.21
The origin of economic liberalization was Jdnos Kadar's 22
"New Economic Mechanism," a policy introduced in 1968 as Hun-
gary's first major turn away from central planning.23 There were
further moves-halting, uncertain, and often contradictory-to-
ward a market economy in the two decades that followed.24 Inheri-
tance and gift taxes were reduced by twenty to forty percent in
1986, and bonds and savings accounts were completely exempted
from taxation. 25 The tax exemptions favored those wealthy enough
to have savings, and were designed to speed the capital formation
process. The foreign investment law was liberalized. It cut joint
venture profit taxes from forty percent to twenty percent, created
tax holidays for new companies in certain fields, allowed western
majority participation and guaranteed profit repatriation to foreign
companies.26 This law also simplified licensing, registration and
accounting procedures to attract foreign capital.27
The following year parliament adopted laws that allowed pri-
vate ownership of farmland2s and instituted bank reform.29 In
January 1988, another tax reform law was passed. Parliament
21. The defining feature of actually existing socialism in Eastern Europe from
1947-1989 was 'state control of the means of production in order to create material
equality among citizens. See also SCRUTON, supra note 11, at 4, 435, and 447 for
definitions of the terms "actually existing socialism," "socialism," and "state
socialism."
22. Kadar was the HSWP Prime Minister of Hungary from 1956 to 1988. He was
installed by the Soviet Union immediately following the destruction of the 1956 re-
bellion, and ruled until he was quietly removed by his own party in 1988. He died
one year later. Kadar cautiously implemented economic reforms throughout the
1970s and 1980s. See Obituary of Jdnos Kadar, DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 7, 1989, at
21 (briefly discussing his life and policies as Prime Minister).
23. See supra note 13.
24. The reforms were contradictory in many ways, however, because they often
allowed some types of private enterprise without making structural changes neces-
sary to give the liberalizations any real meaning. For example, joint ventures with
foreign companies were allowed since 1972, but almost never occurred due to exorbi-
tant profit taxes and excessive regulations. Hungary: Reform of the Foreign Invest-
ment Laws Leads to Increase in the Number of Joint Ventures - Problems and
Opportunities, Part 1, GAs DAnLY RISK MONITOR, Mar. 26, 1987, available in NEXIS,
NEWS Library, ARCNWS File. Thus, part of the early revolutionary effort in 1989
was to pass all-encompassing statutory changes to remove any lingering barriers to
the market economy.
25. Hungary; Inheritance and Gift Taxes Reduced under New Law, BBC Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts, July 10, 1986, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library,
ARCNWS File.
26. GAS DAILY RIsK MONrrOR, supra note 24.
27. Id.
28. Hungary Legalizes the Private Sale and Purchase of Farmland, Xinhua Gen-
eral Overseas News Service, Mar. 20, 1987, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library,
ARCNEWS File. The law allowed a maximum of six thousand square meters to be
1995] 309
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passed the basic privatization law in 1988,30 known as the Compa-
nies Act.31 This allowed state enterprises to transform themselves
into limited liability corporations or stock corporations. The Com-
panies Act reintroduced capitalist production relations to the Hun-
garian economy, and was thereafter used as the basis for
privatization.3 2 Although the original text of this Act was couched
in the language of state socialism-referring, for example, to the
"people's economy" and to the "more efficient utilization of social
property"- its primary purpose was completely at odds with social-
ist orthodoxy.33 The Companies Act also created a legal framework
for developing employer business organizations similar to those of
the western market economies.3 4
In October parliament approved the most liberal foreign in-
vestment law in the region. It is known as the Foreign Investment
Act of 1988.35 The law opened Hungary to enormous investment by
Western corporations, gave foreigners the rights to create or join
Hungarian companies,3 6 and guaranteed to them the full protection
and security of their investments.3 7 All of these changes were ad-
vanced by the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party (HSWP).38 The
seeds of a market economy, therefore, were already apparent in the
late socialist legal system.
owned by an individual. Until this law was passed, almost all farmland belonged to
the state.
In 1988, Istvan Degen, the head of a sub-department of the HSWP Central Com-
mittee stated, "We reject theses [sic] that the state form of property is the supreme
one." Is Private Investment in Hungary Consistent with Socialism?, BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, June 17, 1988, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, ARCNWS
File. A public statement like this, which contradicts the essence of state socialist
theory, would have been impossible in any other Soviet bloc country (except the So-
viet Union itself) at this time, and demonstrates just how far the HSWP had pushed
reform by 1988.
29. Jason McDonald, Transition to Utopia: A Reinterpretation of Economics,
Ideas, and Politics in Hungary, 1984 to 1990, 7 E. EuR. POL. & SOCIETIES 203, 219
(1993).
30. Act VI on Economic Associations of 1988 (Companies Act), translated in U.S.
DErPT. OF COMMERCE, CENTRAL & E. EUR. LEGAL TEXTs, Oct. 10, 1988.
31. Id.
32. NIGEL SwAIN, HUNGARY: Ti RISE AND FALL OF FEASIBLE SOCIALISM 10
(1992).
33. Id.
34. IN'L LABOUR OFFICE, UNITED NATIONS, WORLD LABOR REPORT, 51 (1994).
35. The original law was Act XXIV of 1988 regarding investments by non-resi-
dents in Hungary. Translated in U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CENTRAL & E. EuR.
LEGAL TEXTs, Oct. 10, 1988. See also Two Cheers for Hungarians, Three for Balts,
None for Czechs, ECONOMIST, Oct. 15, 1988, at 59 (U.K edition at 61). See also Gray
et al., supra note 20, at 307.
36. Companies Act, supra note 30, at Part One, Chapter I, § (40(1).
37. Id. at § (1)(1).
38. The HSWP ruled Hungary from 1948 until 1989. During this time, the
HSWP was, for all practical purposes, the Hungarian government.
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The socialist constitution of 1949 has never been repealed, but
was extensively rewritten in 1989.39 This is known as the "new"
constitution. The HSWP itself was responsible for this radical re-
invention of the constitution, which was passed through the HSWP-
dominated parliament.40 This revision occurred in October, only a
month before the total collapse of the HSWP government.41
The new constitution created a western-style parliamentary
democracy, an independent constitutional court, and an independ-
ent judiciary. Unlike most western constitutions, it defines the ba-
sic economic doctrine of the country and certain economic rights of
individuals. The constitution declares that "Hungary has a market
economy in which public and private property are to receive equal
consideration and protection under the law,"42 and that the state
"recognizes and supports the right to enterprise and the freedom of
economic competition."43 The rights to property and inheritance
are also guaranteed. 44 On the other hand, the constitution makes
numerous guarantees regarding the social welfare of its citizens. 45
The government has largely ignored these constitutionally-guaran-
39. About 80% of the constitution was replaced. "[Als legislators like to say, the
only sentence that remains unchanged is the identification of Budapest as the capi-
tal city." E. EUR. CONST. REv., Summer 1992, at 4 (untitled note). Even the name of
the country was changed, from the "People's Republic of Hungary" to just the "Re-
public of Hungary."
40. E. EuR. CONST. REv., Spring 1992, at 3 (untitled note) (describing briefly
what has happened to constitutional reform from 1989 to 1991). After the 1989 revi-
sions, there has been much talk but little action regarding further changes to the
constitution. Id.
41. At least half a year before this event, the HSWP Justice Minister had spoken
openly of creating a western-style constitution, even praising the achievements
and longevity of the bourgeois constitutions. See David Lewis, Law Professor
Spearheads Quiet Revolution in Hungary, The Reuter Library Report, Dec. 29, 1988,
available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, ARCNWS File.
42. A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKETMANYA [Constitution of the Republic of Hun-
gary], Ch. I, Art. 9, § (1), translated in U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CENTRAL & E. EUR.
LEGAL TEXTs, Dec. 31, 1990.
43. A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKETMANYA [Constitution of the Republic of Hun-
gary], Ch. I, Art. 9, § (2).
44. Id., Ch. I, Art. 13, § (1), and Ch. I, Art. 14.
45. The articulation of these rights is not surprising, considering that this consti-
tution (still in force today) was written by the HSWP. Several positive economic
rights are thus defined. The state will see "to the wants of the needy through a long
line of social measures." Id., Ch. I, Art. 17. The state "guarantees the equality of
men and women in regard o all ... economic... rights." Id., Ch. XII, Art. 66, § (1).
The two subsequent sections in this article guarantee economic rights specific to wo-
men. Section (2) states that "mothers receive special support and protection before
and after the birth of their children, in compliance with separate provisions of the
law." Section (3) says that "[Sipecial rules ensure protection for women and young
people in the performance of their jobs." "Every child has the right to enjoy the care
and protection on the part of their families, and by the State and society, that is




teed social welfare rights during the post-1989 rush to capitalism.
These constitutional guarantees may be the rights to which present
and future calls for social justice in economic reform can appeal.
This much reform was accomplished under the leadership of
the HSWP before the 1989 revolution because the party understood
its weakening position and the way history was moving in the late
1980s. State economies throughout Eastern Europe had proven in-
capable of producing sustained economic growth relative to the
West and consequently were incapable of meeting growing con-
sumer demands.46 Hungarian elites (HSWP deputies and state en-
The right to work and "to the free choice of employment and occupation" is guar-
anteed. Id., Ch. XII, Art. 70/13, § (1). All citizens have the "right to equal pay for
equal work," Id., § (2), and everyone who works has "the right to emolument that
corresponds to the amount and quality of the work performed." Id., § (3). The fol-
lowing section provides "the right to rest and free time for recreation, and regular
paid holidays." Id., § (4). The right to form organizations "for the protection of eco-
nomic and social rights together with others, or to adhere to such an organization" is
protected, id., Ch. XII, Art. 70/C, § (1), and the right to strike is listed but can be
exercised only as far as the law allows. Id., § (2).
Another Article in this chapter guarantees the right to social security to all citi-
zens, Id., Art. 70/E, § (1), but the next sentence describes the particular disadvan-
taged groups which are entitled to "the provisions necessary for subsistence." These
are the elderly, the ill, the disabled, widows or orphans, and those unemployed
through "no fault of their own." The apparent meaning of this section is that all
citizens, who happen to become a member of one these protected categories have a
right to state-provided support, not all citizens per se, as the first sentence standing
alone would seem to indicate. The next section in this article "upholds the right of
people to being provided for through the social security system and its institutions."
Id., § (2). Again, it is unclear whether this means a general right or whether it only
extends to those individuals falling within one of the groups listed in the immedi-
ately preceding section.
There is one other Article in this chapter which protects the rights of the poor
explicitly, Id., Art. 70/A, § (1), and any discrimination under this section "is strictly
punishable by law." Id., § (2). In the same Article, "Hungary promotes the realiza-
tion of equality before the law with measures aiming to eliminate inequalities of
opportunity." Id., § (3).
The movement for constitutional reform and the creation of a permanent consti-
tution is gathering momentum again, and economic rights may not fare as well in
any new document, even though the parliament is again dominated by the socialists.
(Parliament enacts the constitution.) Id., Ch. II, Art. 19, § (3Xa). While the socialist
party in power is the successor to the HSWP (which wrote the current constitution),
it has nonetheless promised to push privatization and the elaboration of the market
economy. See infra note 189. As I will document later, the goal of maintaining broad
constitutionally-guaranteed protections for social welfare rights is mutually exclu-
sive of the current privatization process. Thus, it will be interesting to see whether
the socialist party will pursue privatization or social welfare guarantees if forced to
choose when re-drafting the constitution.
46. There was a growing disparity in standards of living existing in Hungary and
Western Europe in the 1980s. Hungarians were especially conscious of this dispar-
ity because of their relative freedom to travel to Western Europe (unlike their neigh-
bors in the other Soviet bloc countries). At this time, there was widespread
awareness, among both the general public and elites in the HSWP, of the failure of
state socialist planning in Eastern Europe to maintain an economy which could keep
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terprise managers), who were better off than the rest of society
under state socialism, discovered in the 1980s that they could suc-
cessfully reposition themselves to benefit personally from the com-
ing free market system. 4 7 The HSWP gradually surrendered
socialist orthodoxy, therefore, and moved cautiously into the free
market paradigm in that decade.48 HSWP elites profited from the
revenue brought in by privatization and foreign investment, 49 and
are presently among the main winners in the emerging market
economy. 50 Consequently, class divisions in Hungarian society,
which existed in a more muted form until 1989, were aggravated by
the free market revolution, rather than erased.51
pace with post-war economic development in the West. See generally SLAvENKA
DRAKULic, How WE SURVIVED COmmuNISM AND EVEN LAUGHED (1993).
This is not to say that the socialist government could claim no achievements-
there were many. The pre-1989 regime created a relatively effective and widely
available (if not technologically advanced) health care system, guaranteed pension
and real financial security in old age, housing for practically everyone, a stable econ-
omy in which almost everyone had some guarantee of employment. As post-1989
revolutionary changes proceed, the old system looks increasingly better by
comparison.
47. "[The reformed communist] is the most urbane of ghosts. No gibbering, no
rotting shroud. It wears a smart suit; it laughs infectiously and runs up and down
the steps of parliaments carrying a laptop and a copy of the Financial Times. It asks
international bankers to lunch, and talks gravely about the need to restrain wage-
push inflation. Only the sharpest ears can detect a faint clank of chains." Neal As-
cherson, An Urbane Spectre with a Suit and a Laptop is Haunting Europe, IN-
DEPENDENT, May 15, 1994, at 20.
48. The example of the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev was an enormous
boost to reform-leaning deputies in the HSWP. Obviously, the relatively bold moves
toward a market economy that went into place after 1986 could not have happened
without at least tacit approval from the Soviet Union. The surprising part of all the
reform within the Soviet bloc was the extent to which the Soviet Union itself out-
paced the Hungarians in terms of implementing privatization. In October, 1989, for
example, Gorbachev warned East German leader Erich Honecker that "history pun-
ishes those who are late." See Europe: Five Years Later; The Decades of Division,
L.A. TamsS, Nov. 1, 1994, World Report, at 10. This factor is important in terms of
explaining HSWP attitudes toward economic restructuring.
49. "In a report examining the privatisations under way, the [International Met-
alworkers' Federation] says that jobs and workers' living standards are being sacri-
ficed, while ex-Communist officials in collusion with foreign banks and financial
advisors are profiting handsomely." IMF: East European Privatisation Benefiting
Former Communist Nomenklatura?, EuR. INFO. SERVICE, MULTINATIONAL SERVICE,
SECTION II: THE TRADE UNION CHALLENGE, No. 337, Nov. 20, 1993.
50. Id. See also Akos R6na-Tas, The First Shall be Last? Entrepreneurship and
Communist Cadres in the Transition from Socialism, 100 AM. J. Soc., No. 1, July
1994, at 40. In Hungary ex-HSWP cadres are more successful than other people in
the new free market economy. They tend to maintain and expand their elite posi-
tions relative to the rest of society. Id.
51. See infra notes 180-83 and accompanying text. Even though political democ-
racy has developed to some extent in Hungary, a major issue in the 1994 elections
was "the increasing distance between the government and the citizens. The govern-
ment began to inhabit a place worlds apart from the populace. It seemed more in-
trigued by what could be freely pillaged, and showed little interest in the day-to-day
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Hungarians became increasingly critical of their economic sys-
tem in the late 1980s, and demands for liberalization grew.52 The
dissatisfaction with the state economy was substantially misplaced,
however, as Hungarians compared the reality of socialism with the
ideal of capitalism.53 Hungarians tended to concentrate on the suc-
cesses of capitalism and ignored its failures in the 1980s and
through the early revolutionary years of 1989 and 1990.54 There
was, therefore, little comprehension before 1989 of the enormous
human suffering that would result from a radical transformation to
a market economy. 55 Also, many reformers misjudged Hungary's
chances of thriving in a market economy, and initially believed that
free market economic success would come fast and with immediate
benefits.56
These misperceptions about the ease with which a market
economy could be created were common, but were not fully under-
stood until it was too late-when unemployment, poverty and infla-
problems of the average person." Peter Nadori, The Return of the Pink Pussycats, 7
UNCApTrIVE MINDs, No. 2(26), Summer 1994, at 52.
52. After the Soviet military crushed the 1956 uprising, Kadar struck an implicit
deal with the Hungarian people, promising them economic prosperity in return for
their acquiescence in the oppressive political system. Kadar largely fulfilled this
promise for the three decades following 1956. In the late 1980s, however, the Hun-
garian economy began to falter, and the rate of material progress and income growth
began to slow. Hungary was increasingly burdened by foreign debt in the 1980s, as
well.
53. For a presentation of this argument in detail, see McDonald, supra note 29,
at 206-07. He describes how "economic utopianism" colored Hungarian's perceptions
of radical privatization and restructuring. "The point is that the institutions of the
[capitalist] model exist in one country and constitute a utopia for another." Id. at
206-07. See also Linnet Myers, 'New Left'Rises from Communists'Ashes, Cm. TPm.,
June 5, 1994, at C1. "Many East Europeans seemed stunned by the factory closings
and poverty that accompanied free market competition. They looked forward [in
1989] to the opportunity to become rich under capitalism, but hadn't considered the
chances of becoming poor." Id. Similarly, Hungarians generally equated political
freedoms with the existence of a capitalist system. Id. See also Walter C. Neale,
Society, State, and Market: A Polanyian View of Current Change and Turmoil In
Eastern Europe, 25 J. OF ECON. IssuEs, No. 2, June, 1991, at 467.
54. The dominant belief in 1989 and shortly thereafter was that the free market
would make everyone in Hungary as prosperous as Western Europeans. See gener-
ally McDonald, supra note 29. This belief blinded many people to the reality of eco-
nomic transition. Id.
55. There were many causes for this misperception, not least of which was the
fact that the transformation from state socialism to market capitalism had never
before been made anywhere in the world. See supra note 15. "Expectations were
inflated both domestically and internationally over the required timeframe to com-
plete the economic transition. Many experts failed to factor in the wide economic
and social ramifications of mass privatization." Katalin Barazda, Hugary-Priva-
tization, MARKET REPORTS, 1994 National Trade Data Bank, Mar. 17, 1994, available
in NEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
56. Id.
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tion caused by the massive post-1989 restructuring had already
begun to affect society.
(b) Post-Revolutionary Privatization and Foreign
Investment Laws
A unique combination of events in 1989 persuaded the ruling
HSWP to remove itself from power. 57 This happened swiftly and
without bloodshed,5s ending more than four decades of one-party,
socialist, and foreign-imposed rule. Hungarians met the end of one-
party socialist rule with a demand for the apparent utopia of west-
ern-style capitalism.59 Repealing or modifying the laws of the so-
cialist state became an important part of the process of creating a
market economy.
Two distinct objectives have driven the reform of the legal sys-
tem since 1989. First, Hungary sought to create a western-style
multi-party democracy subject to a constitutionally-defined separa-
tion of powers and checks and balances.60 This project has been
largely accomplished. It is mostly beyond the scope of this article
and has been written about extensively elsewhere.61 Second, in
57. This event was the "assisted suicide of actually existing socialism." Norman
Rush, What was Socialism... and Why We Will Miss It So Much, 258 NATION, No. 3,
Jan. 24, 1994, at 91. At the same time as it officially disbanded, the HSWP re-
formed itself as the Hungarian Socialist Party, and now sometimes (albeit reluc-
tantly) refers to itself as the "successor party." It promised in 1989 that it would
henceforth only participate as just another political party in a multi-party democ-
racy. In the summer elections of 1994, it regained control of the government. See
infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
58. "The Hungarian political transition was the quietest revolution of the 20th
century; it happened so quietly that, as it is said, 'not even a window pane was bro-
ken.'" Jdnos Simon, Post-Paternalist Political Culture in Hungary: Relationship Be-
tween Citizens and Politics During and After the "Melancholic Revolution" (1989-
1991), 26 COMMUNIST AND PoST-CoMmuNIr STUDrEs, No.2, June 1993, at 238.
59. See generally McDonald, supra note 29.
60. Hungarians want a political system that is procedurally fair and which dis-
courages extremist parties, either left or right, from gaining power. See E. EuR.
CONST. REv., Spring, 1994, at 69 (untitled note) (describing Hungary's progress in
post-1989 political reform).
61. Some political (and non-economic) factors enter into the equation explaining
the desire for reform both before and after 1989. Perhaps the largest of these is the
issue of national sovereignty. While many elites in the HSWP were committed to the
socialist system, they were not committed to the Soviet Union's definition of and
enforcement of that system, and resented external interference in Hungary. Fur-
ther, the history of the 1956 rebellion points to the influence of the sovereignty fac-
tor. More than two thousand Hungarians died as a result of the failed revolution of
1956, and the effect of that event, although difficult to interpret and measure, should
not be ignored.
However, many seemingly political factors are more "economic" than they ap-
pear at first glance. Most evidence shows that the 1956 uprising was a call for par-
ticipatory socialism more than a reactionary counter-revolution demanding a return
to the fascist years under Horthy and Gombos. The uprising was led by workers'
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1989 a paramount concern in legal reform was the creation of a vir-
tually unregulated market economy. The general plan seeks to
privatize the economy to catch up with Western Europe, secure
membership in the European Community, and participate in and
benefit from the world capitalist economy.6 2 The second objective,
creating a market economy, is presently a more interesting ques-
tion since economic dissatisfaction is far more widespread than
political dissatisfaction. 63 Therefore, this section will focus on
changes in the laws associated with the economic transformation.
Statutory changes created after 1989 currently chart the
course for privatization in Hungary. These legal reforms reflect
elite attitudes toward economic reform, the desires of western gov-
councils. Laszlo Abod, a veteran dissident of 1956 and then a member of the Buda-
pest Central Workers' Council, says that:
the councils, which had appeared throughout the country, stood for 'the
defense of socialism, for workers' power and workers' ownership, and
for the struggle against reaction.' He is still of the same opinion today.
'Nobody wanted to give the factories back to the capitalists,' he recalls.
They wanted workers' ownership, so that workers could have a genuine
say in management.' This type of thinking doesn't go down too well
today in Hungary, where privatization is one of the lynchpins of govern-
ment policy. And yet the views of Abod were arguably the views of the
majority at the time. Writer Istvan Eorsi was active in intellectual cir-
cles in 1956. He, too, spent four years in prison. Today he is a sup-
porter of the opposition Free Democrats, a party that strongly
advocates free-market developments. Yet he agrees that in 1956 the
main political thrust was to create a different, democratic form of so-
cialism. 'Nobody wanted to go back to the old, pre-war system,' he ad-
mits. The documents and newspaper cuttings of 1956 all confirm this.
Bob Dent, Letter from Budapest; Influence of 1956 Uprisings in Hungary, NEW
STATESMAN & Soc'y., Oct. 29, 1993, at 11. "Although [1956] was a rising against the
so-called socialist state, it was not a rising against socialism. Far from it. The
revolution recreated socialism anew as the most radical form of democracy." Bill
Lomax, The Rise and Fall of the Hungarian Working Class, in C.M. H, MARKET
ECONOMY AND CiviL Socwry IN HUNGARY 57 (1990). For other good accounts of the
1956 revolution, see Timothy Foote, 'But if Enough of Us Get Killed Something May
Happen... 'Hungarian Revolution of 1956, SanrHsoNmN, Nov. 1986, at 52, and The
Blood of Budapest; Anniversary of Soviet Invasion, NEW RLmEPUc, Nov. 17, 1986, at
7.
62. See David Firestone, What's Left for the Left? Now that Eastern Europe
Seems to Want Capitalism - and Lots of it - the Left has an Uncertain Role, NEWSDAY,
Jan. 9, 1990, at 3. See also No Halfway House, ECONOMIST, Mar. 24, 1990, at 21
(U.K. edition at 19). At the dawn of Eastern European revolution, there was little
support for social democrats or reform communists. Most people wanted free market
capitalism, and rejected a "Third Way" between state socialism and laissez-faire. Id.
In 1989, the overwhelming majority of Hungarians supported radical privatization of
the economy. At this time, more than two-thirds of the population felt that wide-
spread privatization would be desirable, and almost three-fourths felt that the mar-
ket economy had more advantages than drawbacks. GYORGY CSEPELI & AN'rAL
0RKgNY, IDEOLOGY & PoLICAL BELIEFS IN HUNGARY: Tim TWILIGHT OF STATE So-
CIALISM 124 (1992). In recent years, poverty caused about by rapid privatization has
almost completely destroyed support for "Wild West Capitalism." See infra notes
176-79 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
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ernments and financial institutions, and occasionally public atti-
tudes toward reform. "The legal framework is now being geared
toward encouraging, protecting, and rewarding entrepreneurs in
the private sector."6 4 The old legal system is being replaced by laws
"appropriate to the requirements of a state based on the rule of law
and those of a market economy."65
Although these reforms began under the HSWP government,
during that time (from 1968 until the fall of the HSWP government)
there was always an ideological commitment to some sort of "social-
ism." Now there is not.66 This is the crucial difference in post-1989
rhetoric and legal reform. No longer is there any requirement to
fashion change within the framework of socialist ideology. The con-
straints of that day, both external (the Soviet military) and internal
(Kadar's power and his personal commitment to socialism, 6 7 for ex-
ample) have been swept away.
The creation of a market economy dominated by private enter-
prise has been accomplished through statutory, rather than consti-
tutional, change. 68 The passage of laws that smooth the way for
selling state enterprises to foreign investors has been the govern-
64. Gray et al., supra note 20, at 295.
65. Lawyers Recommend Comprehensive Review of the Current Legal System,
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Apr. 29, 1992, available in NEXIS, NEWS Li-
brary, ARCNWS File.
66. Since 1989, the whole socialist past, including its forms of property, institu-
tional arrangements, and welfare politics, has been completely delegitimized.
Zsuzsa Ferge, Marginalization, Poverty and Social Institutions, in 16 LABOR & SOC'Y
417, 421 (1991). But the political constraints of demands for equality and social wel-
fare are still powerful factors in Hungarian politics, just not in the highly ideological
form which they previously took. Related to this is the profound backlash against
rapid privatization of the economy. See Myers, supra note 4. Many Hungarians are
demanding a return to some elements of the old socialist system. The important
point is that the ideological elements of the socialist system and its language have
disappeared as a political force.
67. Despite his complicity in the suppression of the 1956 rebellion by Soviet
soldiers, Kadar was later tolerated by the Hungarian people. From humble begin-
nings, he was genuinely dedicated to socialist ideals and lived modestly throughout
his rule. On account of his beliefs, he suffered both in a fascist prison during World
War II, and in a Stalinist prison during the Rakosi years. See supra note 22.
68. What has happened to the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary since
1989? As noted earlier, the socialist constitution was 80% revised in that year. The
preamble to the 1989 version states that "the National Assembly, until the adoption
of the new Constitution of the country, establishes the text of the Constitution of
Hungary as follows." A MAGYAR KOZTARsAsAG ALxETmANYA, Preamble, quoted in Pe-
ter Paczolay, Constitutional Transition and Legal Continuity, 8 CoNN J. IhT'L L. 559,
564 (1993) (emphasis added). Thus, the assumption was that the 1989 document
was to be only an interim solution. A new constitution, however, has yet to be writ-
ten. In September, 1994, new talks regarding the creation of this constitution were
on parliament's agenda. See New Constitution Talks to Begin in September, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Aug. 23, 1994, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library,
CURNWS File. See also supra note 40.
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ment's top priority. Parliament has also enacted laws that further
liberalize the banking system, regulate bankruptcies, define con-
tract and, to some extent, property.
Amendments to the 1988 Companies Act and the 1988 Foreign
Investment Act reaffirmed those laws' original commitment to a
market economy, and opened Hungary even further to foreign di-
rect investment. 6 9 In 1991, these amendments eliminated the re-
quirement of government approval on foreign investment,
eliminated a rule prohibiting foreign-owned companies from hold-
ing majority stakes in other Hungarian companies, and expanded
profit repatriation guarantees. 7O These amendments deepened the
previous Foreign Investment Act's obvious bias in favor of foreign
capital. The most generous provisions apply to companies with for-
eign investment that operate hotels or engage in manufacturing.71
The initial capital requirement for a new company was doubled
(from HF twenty-five million to HF fifty million).72 Hungarian
companies rarely possess capital in this amount. Therefore, the
benefits of the Companies Act amendments, tax and otherwise, ac-
crue mainly to foreign-owned companies or companies with sub-
stantial foreign investment.73 Some tax reductions are even
statutorily limited to companies with at least thirty percent foreign
participation. 74
Privatization accelerated greatly after 1989. The "spontane-
ous privatization" of state enterprises, which led to the underselling
of those firms, caused parliament to enact laws centralizing control
over the privatization process. 75 A 1990 law allowed small state
owned businesses in the service sector to privatize by auction.76 By
69. Act XXIV: Amendments to the 1988 Act on Economic Associations, trans-
lated in U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CENTRAL & E. Euir. LEGAL TEXTS.
70. Hungary: Foreign Investors Still Welcome in Hungary, EuROMONEY INT'L
FIN. L., Mar. 2, 1991.
71. Id.
72. At exchange rates as of January 1, 1995, this amount increased from 236,000
U.S. dollars to 471,000 U.S. dollars.
73. See Budapest Tries to Sell Hungarians on Capitalism, N.Y. Timxs, May 6,
1993, at A13.
74. See EumOMoNEY Ir'L FrN. L., supra note 70. At the end of 1991, parliament
passed a law limiting the tax breaks and tax holidays given to companies with for-
eign investment. These companies retained substantial benefits even after this ac-
tion. Id.
75. Act XIII of 1989, Act VII of 1990 (establishing the State Property Agency).
See Barazda, supra note 55.
76. Act LXXIV of 1990. This law focused on small service sector businesses. For-
eign investors were not allowed to participate in these privatizations. But foreign
capital is generally not interested in small-scale investments in the first place. See
also Andrds Saj6, Has State Ownership Truly Abandoned Socialism? The Survival
of Socialist Economy and Law in Postcommunist Hungary, in GREGORY ALExANDER
& GRAzYNA SKPsKA, A FoURTH WAY? 202 (1994).
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early 1992, about half of these small firms had privatized.77 In
early 1991, the government eliminated parliamentary supervision
and judicial review of privatization, thereby acquiring direct control
over the process. 78 Between 1991 and 1994, the number of firms in
which the state maintained a majority stake dropped from 1,848 to
553 as a result of privatizations or liquidations.79 At the beginning
of 1995, a parliamentary panel decided to continue privatization at
an accelerated pace.SO This panel announced that the state will no
longer maintain majority holdings in banks, utilities, or large in-
dustries. All other state enterprises will eventually be fully
privatizated. 81
II. The Effects of the Post-Revolutionary Economic Laws
Foreign investment and privatization are symbiotically re-
lated under the present course of economic reforms. These prac-
tices,8 2 intensely ideological and integral parts of a theory of
economic reform often forced onto developing countries, guarantee
that the better part of 400 million people in Eastern Europe will be
cast into a lifetime of poverty.
The results in the last five years have been enormous. Hun-
gary now has the most business-friendly laws in Eastern Europe. 83
Since parliament liberalized its foreign investment laws and began
the privatization of state-owned enterprises, western capital has
flooded the country. In the rush to capitalism, virtually everything
of value has been privatized and sold to foreign investors. The state
enterprises which remain in state hands, therefore, are overwhelm-
ingly those that do not make profits.84 Almost every state enter-
prise capable of producing profits has been, or is about to be, sold to
western companies. Foreign investment in Hungary amounted to
1.45 billion dollars in 1991,85 by 1993 it was 2.3 billion dollars,86
and at the beginning of 1994, total foreign investment was over six
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Blaise Szolgemy, Hungarian Parliament Panel Approves Privatization Law,
REUTER EuR. Bus. REP., January 24, 1995.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See infra notes 240-45 and accompanying text.
83. Blaise Szolgyemy, Hungary Still Seen as Foreign Capital's Darling in East,
RETm Eux. Bus. REPoRT, Jan. 10, 1995, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library,
CURNWS File (hereinafter Darling in East].
84. Some of these have been sold to Hungarian investors.
85. UNIrrED NATIONS, ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EuRoPE, ECONOMIC SuRVEY oa




billion dollars, in over 21,000 joint ventures.8 7 More than half of all
foreign investment in Eastern Europe goes to Hungary;88 and Hun-
gary is by far the highest per capita recipient of foreign direct in-
vestment.8 9  Gas and electrical power, the railroad industry,
shipbuilding, steel production, public transportation systems, and
telecommunications are already in the hands of western corpora-
tions or on the auction block at bargain prices. At this rate, Hun-
garians will soon own nothing but their postal service.
Hungary receives a disproportionate share of this investment
because it has passed laws granting generous terms to foreign in-
vestors. Western investors in Hungary have successfully influ-
enced the content of these foreign investment laws through well-
organized lobbying efforts,90 and "Hungary's political elite has con-
sistently encouraged foreign investment.91 Hungary also has a
history of laws that encourage joint ventures, a well-developed
physical infrastructure, cheap labor92 from a highly educated
workforce, 93 low workplace health and safety standards, and even
lower environmental standards.94 Unfortunately, foreign invest-
ment does not benefit most of the population.
Since the Cold War ended, Hungary has netted $7 billion in for-
eign investment, more than all its eastern neighbors combined.
But when Hungarians reckon the impact, it is not the glittering
87. Sam Loewenberg, Hungary Socialists' Stringent Economic Plan, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 1, 1994, at A10. Total foreign investment in Hungary in the first nine
months of 1994 was 926 million dollars. Darling in East, supra note 83. By contrast,
in 1988 there were only about one thousand joint ventures in Hungary. R6na-Tas,
supra note 50, at 50.
88. Williams, supra note 2, at 2.
89. EcoNoMIc COMnsSION FOR EUROPE, supra note 85, at 136. Between 1989
and 1993, Hungary received 280 dollars per capita of foreign assistance including
foreign investment, Romania was a distant second with 185 dollars, and Poland
third with 113 dollars. Russia received less than 13 dollars per capita during this
period, and Ukraine only received 70 cents. Where Aid Really Went, E. EUR. MAR-
xETs, May 13, 1994, available in NEXIS, WORLD Library, ALLWLD File.
90. Anne Henderson, The Politics of Economic Transformation: Foreign Invest-
ment and the Transition to Open Market Economies in Eastern Europe, A Case Study
of Poland and Hungary, Tim NATIONAL CoUNCmI FOR Sovr AND EAsT EUROPEAN
RESEARCH, May 5, 1993, at iii.
91. Id. at ii. Henderson also states that the Hungarian working class has been
"quiescent" in response to foreign investment. Id. at iii. This assertion is mislead-
ing. Whatever silence there is among the working class as to foreign investment is
primarily a result of their exclusion from policymaking, because a broad plurality of
the working class is clearly opposed to foreign investment. See infra note 121.
92. See Craig Whitney, West European Companies Head East for Labor, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 1995, at D3.
93. Hungarian students score third in the world in math and science. Eszter
Cukor & Gyorgy Kavori, Wage Trends in Hungary, 130 IN'L LABouR Rav., No. 2,
1991, at 177-89.
94. Marlise Simons, East Europe Still Choking on Air of the Past, N.Y. TimEs,
Nov. 3, 1994, at Al.
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new boutiques and restaurants in central Budapest they think
of. Those are largely for tourists and Hungary's monied 10
percent. 95
Foreign investment generally increases inequality96 and harms the
host economy as a whole.9 7 Even a strong supporter of foreign in-
vestment in Hungary admits that foreign capital undermines do-
mestic enterprises, and is "driving the majority of the Hungarian
state sector into bankruptcy."9 8 In some cases, state enterprises
were practically given away to foreign investors. 99 This practice
typically rewards both the foreign investor (who gets a bargain) and
the managers of the enterprise (who get lucrative employment con-
95. Old Enemies, supra note 5, at Al. "The downtowns of the major cities dazzle,
but as you move away from the sparkling splendor of recently opened Western shops
to the outskirts of Budapest Prague or Warsaw, you come upon shabbiness and often
enough downright poverty." Eastern Europe: Approaching the West, Swiss REV. OF
WORLD AFFARS, January 3, 1995. See also infra note 163.
96. Volker Bornschier, Dependent Reproduction in the World System: A Study on
the Incidence of Dependency Reversal, in CHARLES F. DORAN, NoRTH/SourH RELA-
TIONS: STUDIES OF DEPENDENCY REVERSAL 103-110 (1983).
97. "Foreign investment entails the depressing possibility that Eastern Euro-
pean nations would simply exchange external military domination by the Soviet
Union for external economic domination by western capitalism." Henderson, supra
note 90, at 2. This is a real threat because western companies which invest abroad
extract more wealth from the host country than they put into it. This occurs because
profits are mostly repatriated, not re-invested into the host economy. Foreign in-
vestment increases unemployment because it is generally capital intensive. It ag-
gravates unequal income distribution because high-income groups are
disproportionately employed by, and otherwise connected to, the foreign company.
Economic growth is adversely affected because the foreign company draws local capi-
tal and "brain power" away from indigenous industries. Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The
Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment: A Framework for Analyzing Invest-
ment Laws and Regulations in Developing Countries, 3 LAw & POLY INV'L Bus., No.
2-3, Mar. 22, 1992, at n. 3 (summarizing the conclusions of C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL.,
AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS AND AmERcAN INTERESTS 354 (1978)). When western
companies invest abroad, their concern is to "make profits out of a given distribution
of income rather than to eliminate the poverty and hardship that exists in developed
as well as undeveloped societies." TERESA HAYTER, THE CREATION OF WORLD POV-
ERTY 80 (1981). See also Volker Bornschier et al., Cross-National Evidence of the
Effects of Foreign Investment and Aid on Economic Growth and Inequality: A Survey
of Findings and a Reanalysis, 84 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY, No. 3, at 651 (1978) (arguing
that foreign investment hinders economic growth and increases income inequality).
See generally LAWRENCE ALSCHULER, MULTINATIONALS AND MALDEVELOPMENT
(1988).
98. Henderson, supra note 90, at iv.
99. In 1989, one of the Hungarian government's largest companies, the lighting
and electronics manufacturer Tungsram, was sold to General Electric for $150 mil-
lion. Its annual production was estimated to be worth approximately $200 million.
Also in that year, Britain's Telfos company paid $4 million for a majority interest in
Hungary's state-owned Ganz Railway Engineering (valued at about $100 million).
Foreign Investment in Hungary: Testing the Water, EcONOMrST, Oct. 21, 1989; Yuri
Fehdr, Versions of Economic Reform: A Complex Debate in Hungary, DISSENT, Sum-
mer 1990, at 348, 349. The underselling of state enterprises has probably decreased




tracts with the new foreign owner).100 The Hungarian people as a
whole suffer, however, because valuable national assets are thereby
sold to foreign corporations at fire sale prices.lOl The new foreign
owners also typically institute mass lay-offs once they control the
firm.
The type of foreign investment projects usually supported by
western governments are those that benefit the "monied 10 per-
cent."10 2 Typical of foreign investment in Hungary are the follow-
ing projects in Budapest which are subsidized by the United States
government: Dunkin' Donuts franchises, Pizza Hut home delivery,
a private western-style dry-cleaning service, a private clothing
store for professional women, a fast food packaging company, a
company that produces armored vans and personal cars, and so
on. '0 3
Another example of how foreign investment is disproportion-
ately targeted to the interests of the rich is in the Hungarian hotel
industry. Foreign investment here is extensive, and most four and
five-star hotels in Budapest are now owned by American or Western
European companies.O 4 These hotels cater to wealthy western
tourists and business travelers. Few Hungarians can afford to pa-
tronize them because the average cost of a night's stay amounts to
about a quarter of the average monthly salary in Hungary.105 Thus
the rate of domestic occupancy in the best Hungarian hotels was 7.3
100. Christopher GA. Bryant, Economic Utopianism and Sociological Realism:
Strategies for Transformation in East-Central Europe, in THE NEW GREAT TRANSFOR-
MATION? CHANGE AND CoNTINUTrY IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE 59 (Christopher GA.
Bryant & Edmund Mokrzycki, eds., 1994).
101. This practice of "spontaneous-privatization" has been largely brought under
control now that the privatization of remaining state enterprises is regulated by the
State Property Agency. There are still examples of state enterprises being under-
sold, however.
102. See Hungarian-American Enterprise Fund (Magyar-Amerikai Vdllalkozdsi
Alap), 4TH ANN. REP. for a description of these investments. The enterprise fund is a
quasi-private branch of the United States government, and is described infra in
notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
103. Id. at 13-21.
104. Andreas F. Lorenz & Thomas P. Cullen, Hotel Investment Opportunities in
Hungary, CORNELL HOTEL & RESTAURANT Ass'N Q., Dec., 1994, at 18. Before one of
Hungary's three largest hotel companies (Pannonia) was privatized and sold, one-
third of its employees were laid off in order to make the property more attractive to
foreign investors. Id. at 25. In January, 1994, the sale of the state's largest hotel
company (HungarHotels) to American General Hospitality was approved but then
cancelled by the government when the price became public and was considered to be
too low. In 1993, however, the gem of this chain, the enormous Duna Intercontinen-
tal in downtown Budapest, was sold to the Mariott corporation. Id.
105. Average wage figure from Eastern Europe: USA is Biggest Investor, HETi
VmACGAZDASAG, May 21, 1994, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
Hotel Figure from MTI Hungarian News Agency, Hungarian Hotel Industry Survey
Results, Nov. 30, 1994, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
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percent in 1993 as compared to 39.9 percent in western Europe in
the same year.106
Foreign developers putting up hotels and business space in
central Budapest "appear to regard Hungary as a theme park for
outlandish schemes that would not be permitted in western Eu-
rope."10 7 The designs of western developers ignore historic charac-
ter preservation in Budapest, and Hungarian architects have not
only aesthetic complaints, but argue that foreign investment has
reduced them to a state of "intellectual and artistic serfdom" as
wage slaves for these developers.108
As foreign capital rolls through Hungary, commodifying or
suppressing local culture, it often extinguishes domestic products,
replacing them with a "better" western variant. (These western
substitute products are often much more expensive than the prod-
uct they replaced and are therefore not available to as many peo-
ple.)109 For example, the more than ten McDonald's locations in
Budapest have effectively destroyed the business of small Hun-
garian street-side food vendors,110 and the new western fast food
chains "do not intend to offer Hungarian dishes."111
Foreign investors exert considerable political influence in
Hungarian politics and lobby for cuts in social welfare spending,
claiming that Hungary "cannot afford" to offer its workforce sick
leave, maternity leave, or paid holidays.112 Today, wholly or partly
106. MTI Hungarian News Agency, supra note 105.
107. Adam Lebor, Welcome to the West, Budapest, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 6, 1993, at
12.
108. Id. See also Ference Andai, Blue Danube: Hungarians Begin to Feel Disillu-
sioned with Way of the West, OTrAWA CrriZEN, July 7, 1993, at All. 'The impact of
aggressive foreign capitalists is evident everywhere, particularly in the capital of
Budapest." Id.
109. Blaise Szolgyemy, Hungary's Traditional Takeaway Dish Loses Out to
'McFood', REUTERS, Jan. 3, 1995, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS
File. The langosh (fried, flat dough with garlic and sour cream) vendors sold their
snacks for about 20 cents each. Hamburgers from Western fast-food chains cost
from 60 cents to two dollars, and "are hardly bargains in a country where the aver-
age after-tax wage barely exceeds $300 a month." Id.
110. Id. See also Hungary: Goliaths Kill David - City Grill Closes, EuzomARKET-
ING, Nov. 8, 1994, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File (describing
how foreign fast food restaurants put the Hungarian "City Grill" fast-food chain out
of business).
111. Id.
112. Mikl6s Szanyi, Experiences with Foreign Direct Investment in Hungary, IN-
sTrruTr FOR WORLD EcONOMICS, HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, Apr. 1994, at 18.
Foreign investors lobby against these employment benefits and social welfare protec-
tions because they must contribute to the cost of programs through payroll taxes.
Id. In some areas of the economy, however, foreign investors are not exempt from
contributing to social insurance.
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foreign-owned companies do not have to contribute to Hungarian
social insurance.11s
Foreign investment in Hungary also aggravates an increas-
ingly unequal global distribution of resources. As ownership of the
means of production is gradually transferred to Western European
and American companies, 1 14 wealth is extracted from Hungary to
be repatriated to the West.115 The profits earned by foreign-owned
enterprises will not stay in Hungary, but will eventually go home
with their western owners, a process that will gradually decapital-
ize Hungary and make real economic growth in the future virtually
impossible.116 Western companies apparently intend to repatriate
most of their profits rather than reinvest them in Hungary because
none of these companies would invest in Hungary before the law
explicitly guaranteed them repatriation rights and currency ex-
change.117 Of the thousands of western companies that now oper-
ate in Hungary, only a few have promised not to repatriate their
profits.118 Hungary is taking on the role of an economic colony
113. The significance of exemption from social insurance contributions is that for-
eign companies reap the benefits of tax holidays but are not required to help the
Hungarian government pay for the social costs of the transition to the market econ-
omy, a transition which these foreign corporations are intimately involved in creat-
ing. This is evidence of how highly Hungarian elites value foreign investment as a
part of the reform process. See generally Zoltan Mihaly, Tax Reforms Roll Out the
Red Carpet for Investors Looking at Central Europe, 4 J. INT'L TAXATION, No. 4 (Apr.
1993).
114. "Around 10 percent of the joint ventures (JVs), mainly the filials of large
trans-national corporations like General Electric, General Motors, Ford, Suzuki,
Nestle, and Unilever, absorb 80 percent of all invested foreign capital. The bulk of
car-making, printing, publishing, glass and construction materials, food-processing,
breweries, tobacco, alcohol, sugar, and candy production is dominated by foreigners."
Judit Kiss, Privatization Paradoxes in East Central Europe, 8 E. EuR. PoLIcS &
SocrmIxs 122, 130 (1994).
115. Hungary's generous repatriation laws allow foreign owners of businesses to
take their profits back to Western Europe and the United States. See supra note 70
and accompanying text.
116. The repatriation of profits is growing. Foreign companies repatriated only
about 10 million dollars in the first half of 1992. Profit Repatriation Negligible in
Hungary, MTI Hungarian News Agency, Aug. 18, 1992, available in NEXIS, NEWS
Library, ARCNWS File. Only a year later, however, repatriation had grown to ap-
proximately 66 million dollars. Also, these figures are probably substantially under-
estimated because foreign investors can take their profits out of Hungary in other
forms, such as export under-invoicing, import over-invoicing or through trademark
fees. Editorial Report, HUNGARiAN TELEGRAPH NEWS AGENCY, July 8, 1994. In 1994,
foreign investors made approximately 600 million dollars in profits, but re-invested
only approximately 70 million dollars. Id.
117. See supra notes 70 and 85-89 and accompanying text.
118. McDonald's has agreed to reinvest its Hungarian profits, as has Henkel Hun-
gary Kft., an Austrian cosmetics and washing detergents company. Henkel Hungary
Kft. to Expand, MTI Hungarian News Agency, Nov. 17, 1994, available in NEXIS,
NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
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where profits and resources flow out of the region and into Ameri-
can and EC bank accounts.11 9
Therefore, it is not at all surprising that Hungarians are in-
creasingly ambivalent about the desirability of further foreign own-
ership.12o A large plurality of the Hungarian working class is
decidedly opposed to any foreign investment at all. 121 "Foreign in-
vestment has generated some 85 percent of revenue from privatiza-
tion. There is a dangerous mood that it is 'them [foreigners], not us'
who are the beneficiaries of capitalism in Hungary."1 2 2 It has be-
come obvious to most people that foreign corporations, even when
denominated "joint ventures,"1 23 are completely unconcerned with
helping the Hungarian people or their economy. In reality, foreign
capital comes to Hungary for one of two reasons-cheap labor or
new markets. The behavior of some foreign companies doing busi-
119. "The fabled free market may result in Eastern Europe taking on characteris-
tics of Latin America. Eastern European governments may soon face similar condi-
tions as their countries become Latin Americanized, except that Western Europe,
not the United States will act as the major colonizer." Saul Landau, A New World to
Exploit: The East Joins the South, Vol. 42, No. 5, MoNTHLY REV., at 29, Oct. 1990.
This inequality is not only noticeable because Eastern Europe is as a whole los-
ing ground vis-a-vis the West. Eastern Europe itself is separating more and more
into haves and have-nots. The wealthiest three countries - the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, and Poland - are relative success stories in comparison with their poorer neigh-
bors Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and the former Soviet Republics. In the latter
group, poverty, disparity of wealth, and general misery exist on a scale even larger
than among the former. In Bucharest, Romania, for example, "beggars roam the sub-
ways, more than 100 homeless children live in the main railway station and
thousands of babies are abandoned each year to orphanages because their mothers
can't feed them." McKinsey, supra note 4, at B7. And in Bulgaria, 64% of children
lived below the poverty line in 1993, as compared to 18% in 1990. After the Wall,
GuARnrLN, Nov. 3, 1994, at T2. See also Perlez, supra note 4.
120. Only a third of Hungarians actually approve of continued foreign invest-
ment, according to a recent poll. Twenty-eight percent view it as a necessary evil,
and 35% disapprove of foreign investment entirely. Hungarian Public Opinion on
Foreign Capital, MTI Hungarian News Agency, Feb. 10, 1995, available in NEXIS,
NEWS Library, CURNWS File (reporting telephone survey by TeleMedia First Hun-
garian Telemarketing Service for the newspaper MAGYAR HmLAP).
121. Forty percent of workers surveyed saw nothing positive in foreign capital,
while only seven percent unconditionally supported it. Jane Perlez, Hungarians
Cooling to Foreign Investment, N.Y. Tnm&s, May 3, 1994, at A12.
122. Ian Traynor, The Worst May Well be Over for the Former Communist States
in Transition, GuARDLAN, Jan. 9, 1993, at 13. See also Hungary: Joint Ventures
Boom on Lax Tax Law, EUROMONEY TRADE FIN. & BANKER INT'L, Apr. 23, 1990.
"Criticisms that the Hungarian authorities are pawning the family silver have
gained momentum since the sale of a stake in Tungsram to General Electric." Id.
123. This term is misleading in the Hungarian context. Most "joint ventures" are
in reality entirely controlled by the Western (American, Austrian, British, or Ger-
man) partner in the venture. Many "joint ventures" have no Hungarian participa-
tion, whatsoever. Lane, supra note 15, at 342. In joint ventures with minority
foreign ownership, there is a trend for the foreign partner to become the majority
owner, either through buying out the Hungarian partner or through "share capital
increases not matched by the Hungarian partner." Id. at 352.
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ness in Hungary also reveals that the interests of Hungarians are
not considered when these companies make decisions.124
The results of the privatization process are also substantial.
In 1989, there were approximately 5000 private firms in Hungary.
At the end of 1993, there were more than 69,000.125 The number of
privatized state enterprises expanded ,by more than 2800 percent
(from 27 to 760) from 1990 to 1993.126 These 760 state enterprises
were on average sold for only twenty to twenty-five percent of the
book value of their assets, "and even less in the case of assets sold to
foreign investors." 127 Even if the assets' book value estimates were
somewhat inflated, it is clear from this data that privatization of
state enterprises brought in much less revenue than desired. It
merely redistributed wealth into private hands. Most agricultural
cooperatives and state farms have been privatized, so that now
ninety percent of all farmland is privately owned.128 Most of Hun-
gary's housing remained in private hands throughout the state so-
cialist period. Privatization of the twenty percent of housing owned
by the state increased rapidly after 1989.129
The process and effects of the Hungarian privatization project
are important because this is "the stage on which will be decided
which social groups will have access to the means of production."13o
124. For example "[wiestern tobacco companies are openly defying cigarette ad-
vertising laws in Hungary," and trying to coerce Hungarian officials into lifting the
bans. Ken Kasriel, Western Tobacco Firms Spurn Hungary's Ad Ban, ADvEirISNG
AGE, Sept. 14, 1992. In another instance, Korf AG of Baden-Baden and Metallgesell-
schaft AG of Frankfurt bought a steel works in Ozd, Hungary, laid off 85% of the
employees, and then, less than a year later, changed their minds about the invest-
ment and pulled out completely, leaving the town economically devastated. The
World Bank, to its credit, subsequently created a job re-training center in Ozd, but
its graduates are placed at cheap labor textile plants owned by Italian and Belgian
producers. Perlez, supra note 121. Since foreign investments began pouring into
Hungary after 1989, Hungarians have "discovered that business decisions by foreign
owners were dictated by corporate headquarters in the West, not by the needs of the
local economy." Id.
125. Bakos, supra note 17, at 1200. According to Bakos, however, this extreme
figure may be misleading because many of the newly incorporated private companies
are "hibernating." Id.
126. Id. at 1199.
127. Id. at 1200-03. Data from Eves jelent6s az dllami vagyon privatizdci6jdr6l,
(Yearly Report on the Privatization of State Property), Allami Vagyoniigyndksdg
(State Property Agency), 1992.
128. Anna Canning & Paul Hare, The Privatization Process -Economic and Polit-
ical Aspects of the Hungarian Approach, in PRIVATIZATION IN CENTRAL & EASTERN
EUROPE 198-200 (Saul Estrin, ed., 1994).
129. Id. at 200-01.
130. J~rai, supra note 9, at 77. "The distribution of wealth in the emerging capi-
talist society is largely determined by the privatization policy applied." Gdbor
Hunya, Frictions in the Economic Transformation of Czechoslovakia, Hungary & Po-
land, in ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION iN EAsT-CENTRAL EUROPE & IN THE NEWLY IN-
DEPEDENT STATES 61 (Gdbor Hunya, ed., 1994). "This transition requires a profound
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In other words, privatization will determine society's economic win-
ners and losers. This, to a large degree, has already been done. The
primary result has been the redistribution of wealth to the rich.131
To ordinary Hungarians, however, privatization "is synonymous
with corruption or unemployment."13 2
The cumulative result of Hungary's free market transforma-
tion, the salient characteristics of which are the privatization and
foreign investment regimes, has been the creation of human suffer-
ing and inequality on a massive scale.133 The specific events creat-
ing this situation are unemployment (caused mostly by the rapid
privatization of state enterprises), inflation (caused both by price
deregulation34 and scheduled price increases),135 and the public
health crisis (caused by the privatization of health care). The com-
bined effects of these and other events have made the "costs of the
transformation... increasingly hard to bear. In most [Eastern Eu-
ropean] countries, the prospects range from the gloomy to the cata-
change in property relations... these changes create a new economic elite and redis-
tribute property and material well-being. In this process, some people gain wealth,
others lose it; some see their incomes grow, while others see a marked deterioration
in their earning power." R6na-Tas, supra note 50, at 40 (describing the change from
socialist to capitalist economies in Eastern Europe).
131. Kiss, supra note 114, at 151. From 1990-1994, the Hungarian government
"privatized state property in an artificial, unjust, and half-witted way designed only
to build up its own clientele." Nadori, supra note 51. "Two years ago, foreigners
acquired 70 percent of privatized property in Hungary. While that figure has de-
creased by now to about 50 or 60 percent, Hungarians still feel largely shut out of the
privatization." Perlez, supra note 121. The Eastern European, including Hun-
garian, experience thus far is that privatization is incompatible with social justice.
Privatization "leads to injustice, gaping economic inequalities, and social tensions,
and creates more losers than winners, at least for the time being." Kiss, supra note
114, at 144. See also Christine Rider, Privatization in the Transition Economies: A
Critique, J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON., June 22, 1994; Peter Murrell, Privatization's
Harms: Economies in Eastern Europe, CURRENT, Jan., 1993, at 34.
132. Lucy Hooker, Hungary Finds that Oranges are not Capitalism's Only Fruit,
GuARDIAN, Feb. 16, 1995, at 11.
133. Economic reform as widespread as that which has taken place in Hungary
since 1989 is a very complex process. It is difficult to isolate the specific effects of
each statutory change. It would be inaccurate and misleading, therefore, to suggest
that privatization and foreign investment are the sole measures of capitalist devel-
opment or the sole causes of the poverty and despair resulting from the reform pro-
cess over the course of the past five years. I focus on privatization and foreign
investment because they are at the core of current economic reforms in Hungary and
throughout Eastern Europe. Also, the complex relationship of internal and external
economic factors makes determining cause and effect problematic, especially when
economic reform of this kind has never happened before. See supra note 15. Also,
many relevant economic events (global economic conditions, for example) occur with-
out reference to the Hungarian legal system and are therefore outside of its
influence.
134. Silviu Brucan, Shock Therapy Mauls Those Who Unleashed it in Eastern Eu-
rope, WORLDPAPER, June 1994, at 3.
135. See infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
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strophic, and instability and unpredictability are largely
present."136 Most observers have found in Eastern Europe a great
likelihood that the gap between rich and poor will widen.137
Unemployment was almost unknown before 1989,138 and most
people valued the high level of job security that existed under state
socialism.139 Most unemployment then was transitional in nature,
and not the result of a structural imperative necessary to keep
wages from rising above a certain level (as it is historically in capi-
talism).140 Most unemployment now is the result of the closing or
privatization of large state enterprises, because the private sector is
not capable of absorbing these laid-off workers back into the
workforce. Thus, unemployment has almost doubled in the last two
years, climbing from 6.6 percent to thirteen percent between 1992
and 1994.141 This is only official unemployment. Actual unemploy-
ment is much higher because there are many more people who
136. INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, UNITED NATIONS, WORLD LABOR REPORT
(1992).
137. Id. passim.
138. There was no significant unemployment until 1986, and unemployment was
only about one percent until 1990. UNICEF, UNITED NATIONS, CENTRAL AND EAST-
ERN EUROPE IN TRANSITION: PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL CONDITIONs 4 (1993). Use of
the term "unemployment" was ideologically unacceptable under state socialism and
did not enter the public discourse until 1987. It is clear, however, that many Hun-
garians began to worry about "employment difficulties" in the mid- to late- 1980s. R.
Angelusz, et al., Unemployment as Reflected in Hungarian Public Opinion, 41 ACTA
OECONOCncA 214 (1989). Whether these difficulties were a product primarily of the
failure of the state economy or of the growing marketization of the economy is argua-
ble, especially insofar as marketization was a response to shortcomings of the
planned economy. In 1987, a study showed that attitudes toward unemployment in
Hungary were extremely differentiated on the basis of the respondent's economic
class. Only ten percent of unskilled manual workers agreed that there were certain
advantages to having unemployment in the economy, while 62% of managers and
intellectuals agreed with this statement. Id. at 217.
139. In 1987, 69% of the population thought unemployment was entirely disad-
vantageous for society. Angelusz et al., supra note 138, at 217.
140. Capitalism cannot function without unemployment. In a situation of full-
employment, workers can successfully demand higher and higher wages (thus desta-
bilizing the system through uncontrolled wage-push inflation) and the employer can-
not replace workers demanding higher wages, because there are no people looking
for work. See Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, in KARL MARX:
EARLY WRITINGS 279-309 (Random House ed., 1975).
141. Williams, supra note 2; Loewenberg, supra note 87. While these figures
may not seem outrageous by Western European standards, one must consider that
under the socialist government in Hungary, unemployment was at the highest
around one percent. (There was underemployment in state socialism, but that is a
somewhat different question.) Therefore, the relative increase in unemployment in
the last five years is enormous.
The unemployment benefits/wage ratio (unemployment benefits divided by the
average nominal wage) has declined continuously since 1991, as has the share of the
unemployed who receive benefits. In 1991, 78% of the unemployed received benefits;
in 1992, 72% did; and by 1993, only 52% did. Thus the hardships imposed by unem-
ployment are growing not only in terms of the numbers of people unemployed, but
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would like jobs but have given up looking for work, and are thus not
reported in the statistics. 142 Unemployment in Hungary dispropor-
tionately harms already disadvantaged groups such as Gypsies, the
unskilled, women, the elderly, and the sick, thereby increasing
inequality by marginalizing broad segments of the population.143
People who become unemployed increasingly tend to remain unem-
ployed, a phenomenon that also stratifies the population and pun-
ishes disadvantaged groups.144
Inflation has also grown enormously since the introduction of
rapid economic reforms. In the first year of the revolution, con-
sumer inflation was about 17.5 percent,145 it peaked at approxi-
mately thirty-five percent in 1991,146 and since then has been
stable at around twenty percent.147 High inflation in any country
has a disproportionately harmful effect on the poor, because people
with limited incomes spend most of their money on food, housing,
and public transportation and are thus harmed more by price in-
creases.148 High inflation in Eastern European societies tends to
increase material inequality which in turn magnifies antagonisms
between social groups. 149 One report asserts that the "prices of ba-
also in terms of the declining availability of benefits for those persons unemployed.
EcONOMIC COMMSSIoN FOR EUROPE, supra note 85, at 90.
142. M. Godfrey et al., Report on a Survey of Unemployment and Active Labour
Market Programmes in Hungary, ILO/JAPAN PROJECT ON EMLOYMENT POLICIS FOR
TRANsTON IN HUNGARY, Oct. 1993. Actual unemployment in Hungary is about 1.3
times greater than official unemployment. Id.
143. Ferge, supra note 66, at 428. Traditionally, Gypsies are the last hired and
first fired, and in 1992 suffered unemployment of around 40%, compared to the na-
tionwide rate of almost 14%. Henry Kamm, Gypsies Suffering in Hungary's Shift,
N.Y. TudEs, Nov. 7, 1993, at A9.
144. As of the last quarter in 1992, the average duration of unemployment was 38
weeks, up from 28 weeks in the first quarter of the year. As of March, 1993, more
than half of the officially unemployed had been jobless for more than six months.
Ruth A. Bandzak, The Role of Labor in Post-Socialist Hungary, 28 J. EcoN. IssuEs
524, (citing data from the Statisztikai Havi Kozlemenyek (Hungarian Central Statis-
tical Office), Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatel (Monthly Bulletin of Statistics), May
1993).
145. Williams, supra note 2.
146. Crossing the East-West Chasm, EcoNoMIs, May 16, 1992 at 57 (U.K edition
at 43).
147. Loewenberg, supra note 87.
148. Expenditures for food, housing, and public transportation are relatively fixed
and necessary costs. Therefore, the lower a family's income, the greater these fixed
costs are as a percentage of the household's total income. Conversely, the rich spend
only a small fraction of their incomes on food, housing, and public transportation,
and thus inflation does not hurt them as much.
149. Grzegorz W. Kolodko, Social and Political Aspects of Inflation, E. EuR.
ECON., Spring 1989, at 50, 51. Data concerning the negative social consequences of
differentiation in material status is from Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary. Id.
Hungarians attitudes toward inflation vary according to the economic class of the
respondent, which clearly demonstrates how inflation disproportionately punishes
the lower classes. In June, 1992, 49% of the lower income respondents (those with
1995]
Law and Inequality
sic goods have hit pensioners and wage earners so hard that insecu-
rity dominates all perceptions of new opportunities, and the
dominant emotion is fear."15o The plight of many fixed-income pen-
sioners (who under socialism were reasonably secure in their retire-
ment) can be observed in Budapest's subway stations, where a
common sight is elderly men and women standing from dawn to
dusk by the exits trying to sell produce or flowers from their gar-
dens. 151 Inflation has forced some pensioners to shoplift or find
food in garbage bins to survive.152
The Hungarian government intentionally creates much infla-
tion (oftentimes at the urging of western advisors and the IMF) in
order to make state-owned enterprises more attractive to potential
foreign investors. For example, beginning in 1995, energy prices
will increase an average of twenty-six percent.15 3 This should
bring more cash to utilities companies. Theoretically, then, the util-
ities' companies rising profits will lure western investment into
these companies. 154 This approach to foreign investment ignores
the fact that these higher energy prices, together with other sched-
uled price increases, will severely and disproportionately harm
those people living in poverty and those with limited incomes.' 55
incomes less than $66 per month) in a survey stated that current price increase were
intolerable, while only 22% of high income respondents (those with incomes greater
than $176 per month) thought the same. This survey also revealed that the poor
were far more fearful than the rich of future price increases. Charles L. Choguill &
Robert Manchin, A Further Consideration of the Human Aspects of Economic Read-
justment in Hungary, 32 SOCIAL INDicATORS RESEARCH (1994), at 80-81.
150. Susan Woodward, The Tyranny of Time: Eastern Europe's Race to the Mar-
ket, BROOKINGS REvmw, Jan. 1992, at 6. See also McKinsey, supra note 4. "'If you
are an elderly person on a pension living alone with an old spouse, you have to
choose between eating and heating and buying medicine,' said Zsuzsa Ferge, Hun-
gary's leading researcher on poverty." Id.
151. The author's personal observation.
152. Andai, supra note 108. "Unidentified Man #1: (Through Translator) Just
look down any of these [Budapest] streets. There isn't one, but three people rum-
maging in every dustbin. Don't talk to me about capitalism. It stinks." Hungarian
Capitalism Mixed Blessing, National Public Radio, Morning Edition (radio broad-
cast, Feb. 24, 1992).
153. Krisztina Feny6, Anger Rises as High as the Prices, BUDAPEST WK., Jan. 5-
11, 1995, at 5 (describing how new price increases will hurt the poor). "Amelia
Horvath (Social Worker): (Through Translator) In 1989 I knew of some families
who had their electricity cut off because they couldn't pay their bills. But today the
number of people in that situation is growing faster than we can count. Ies dark in a
lot of apartments now." National Public Radio, supra note 152.
154. The Hungarian government has announced its intention to sell to foreign
corporations the country's nine electric power companies and five distribution com-
panies. Hungary to Speed Up Energy Sector Privatization, REUTER Eua. Bus. RE-
PoRT, January 24, 1995.
155. Feny6, supra note 153. One third of Hungarian families are now below the
poverty line. These are the people who bear most of the costs of reform. Id. Other
scheduled price increases in 1995 are as follows: public transportation by 20%, tele-
[Vol. 13:303330
HUNGARY AFTER THE REVOLUTION
Health care will be less available to most Hungarians if gov-
ernment privatization plans are put into place. Post-1989 reform of
the health care system was driven by free market ideology, 156 ex-
emplified by the fact that "in 1991 the main slogan of the govern-
ment's health policy was the following: 'Health care will no longer
be a citizen's right'."157 The consequence of moving toward health
care privatization will be to leave some people out of universal cov-
erage.15 8 Support for public health care has already weakened, and
a recent UNICEF report documents "a deterioration of unparalleled
proportions in human welfare throughout most of the region," char-
acterized by the growth of infectious diseases, stress, malnutrition
and alcoholism. 159 The World Health Organization reports that
health care systems in Eastern Europe have begun to collapse since
1989, and tuberculosis is climbing to epidemic levels in Hungary
and neighboring countries. 160 Life expectancy fell during the pe-
riod 1990-1995 throughout most of Eastern Europe, and especially
phone by 6%, postal services by 15%, and meat and milk by 20%. Id. All of these
increases affect items or services which are necessary for everyday work and life.
This scheduled inflation, therefore, disproportionately punishes the poor and those
living on fixed incomes (pensioners and other people on public assistance). See supra
note 148.
156. Eva Orosz, Handicapped by Old and New Traps: Hungary's Health Care Re-
form, 44 INT'L Soc. SECURTrrY REv. 25 (1991).
157. Id. The new socialist government of Gyula Horn, however, has at least pro-
fessed that every person should have access to basic health care services. The nuts
and bolts health care policy of the Horn government remains to be seen. See MZSP's
Csehak Views Health Care, MAGYAR HIRLAP, translated in E. EUR. INTELLIGENCE
REP., June 1, 1994.
158. "As a consequence, some of the most disadvantaged groups are likely to be
left out of such insurance. For example, those who receive unemployment benefits
are entitled to health insurance, but when their unemployment benefit expires they
may become uninsured. Under the present turbulent socio-economic circumstances,
many miserable situations can not be foreseen; hence, elimination of universal eligi-
bility may have tragic consequences. Creation of such a "bottomless" system - taking
into consideration the distressing increase in poverty and unemployment - shows the
insensitiveness [sic] of the government to the real social problems." Orosz, supra
note 156, at 25.
159. Barbara Crossette, For Region's Poor, Economic Changes Bring a High Cost,
INT'L HERALD TRm., Oct. 8, 1994, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS
File. See also Eastern European Demography; Of Death and Dying, ECONOMIST, Jan.
7, 1995 at 41. "Communism could seriously damage your health; but post-commu-
nism is proving even worse." Id. at 41. See also Eastern Europeans Discover Capital-
ism Kills, UN Claims, HERALD (Glasgow), Oct. 7, 1994, at 8.
160. See Edward Luce, TB Rises in Eastern Europe, GUARDIAN, June 21, 1994, at
10. "The WHO was careful to avoid overt political criticism of the switch to laissez-
faire economics in eastern Europe, but privately officials expressed anger at the way
the former communist countries had been encouraged by Western aid donors to dis-
mantle free health care services." Id. See also WORLD HEALTH ORoANIZATION,




in Hungary.161 This deterioration of national health is the direct
product of radical privatization in Eastern Europe.162 The biggest
western investment in Hungarian health care, thus far, is the open-
ing of a private hospital in Szentendre designed to serve the wealth-
iest two percent of the country's population.163
The rapid pace of economic reform has magnified another
problem previously almost unknown-homelessness. 164 As of late
1993, there were an estimated twenty to thirty thousand persons in
Budapest without any housing.165
Women suffer disproportionately from the ill effects of capital-
ism in Hungary and in the rest of Eastern Europe. x6 6 Privatization
161. See Drive to Market Reform Endangers Democracy: Report, Agence France
Presse, Feb. 3, 1995, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
162. The state of national health in Eastern Europe is clearly related to privatiza-
tion. The only two countries in the region which increased public health expendi-
tures after 1989 - the Czech Republic and Slovakia - are also the only two countries
with decreasing post-1989 mortality rates. ECONOMisT, supra note 159. UNICEF
Director General James Grant, in discussing the deterioration of children's health
and welfare throughout Eastern Europe, and including Hungary, explicitly blamed
privatization for the emerging health disaster:
Mr. Grant criticised Western institutions such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for advising political leaders
to undertake economic reforms without giving due consideration to the
social consequences. He acknowledged that the West has provided a
number of economic advisors, but very little in the way of social welfare
counselling.
UNICEF Assesses Social Costs of Reforms in Eastern Europe, EURo-EAST, Feb. 22,
1994.
163. Hungary: Soviet Barracks to Become American Private Hospital, FiGYELO,
translated in Reuter Textline, Feb. 17, 1994, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library,
CURNWS File. This is an excellent example of how foreign investment usually ig-
nores issues of distributional justice in host countries like Hungary. Western inves-
tors are primarily concerned with profits, and not with the effects of their business
activities on the distribution of income or resources in the countries in which they
invest. See also supra note 124.
164. See JANos KORNAi, THE SOCIALST SYSTEM: THE PoLrricAL ECONOMY OF COM-
MUNIsM, 312 (1992). Under state socialism, housing was a right, and the state en-
sured that everyone had some place to live. This is not to say that in practice state
socialist governments provided adequate housing, for they rarely did. Housing
shortages and overcrowding were endemic in Eastern Europe under state socialism.
There were, however, very few people with no housing at all. Id.
165. Glum Christmas for East Europeans, Agence France Presse, International
News, Dec. 25, 1993, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File. See also
Cold Winter Tortures Hungarian Homeless, Xinhua General Overseas News Service,
Jan. 7, 1993, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, ARCNWS File. ("It is estimated
that 10,000 are long-time homeless people and another 25,000 to 30,000 spend the
night in the [subway] tunnels.") "Unidentified Man #4: (Through Translator) They
took away my flat and my furniture. My wife and I sleep under a staircase now. the
government goes on about how Hungary must catch up with Western Europe, but is
this the price we have to pay? It's killing us." NPR, supra note 152.
166. See Alan Boyle, In Eastern Europe, Life Getting Harder for Women, STAR
TRm. (Minneapolis), Sept. 5, 1993, at Ell (contrasting how Czech women are losing
access to child care, which was subsidized by the former communist government,
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and market reforms have brought the sex industry to Hungary.
Privatization is "convert[ing] love and sex into commodities."167
Prostitution, for example, has reached epidemic proportions over
the course of the last five years.16s Even the Hungarian women's
movement has been commodified and manipulated by a western
agenda, so that "almost all scholarly research on women in Hun-
gary has so far been inspired, financed, and published by foreign
institutions or agencies."169 The newly emerging capitalist system
disproportionately punishes other historically disadvantaged
groups as well.170
with the concurrent explosion of pornography and prostitution across Eastern
Europe).
At first, the collapse of Communist governments gave women and men
alike hope for a better life. But life has instead gotten tougher for wo-
men in particular, feminists say. Rather than improving their lot, wo-
men are losing many of the things they once took for granted - such as
equity in education and the workplace, reproductive rights, free health
care and child care.
Id. On the other hand, gender equality in Eastern Europe under state socialism was
realized in mostly superficial ways. The literature is substantially divided on the
question of which system, pre- or post-1989, did more for the realization of gender
equality. What seems clear is that the situation for women was relatively bad under
state socialism, and is also bad in the emerging market economies.
Instead of being thankful for the privilege of the Communist "equality"
with men, which forced women to climb scaffolding, to get black lung
disease in coal mines, to drive tractors and harvestors and hand-milk
cows for pennies at the collective farms, we dreamed of the promised
inequality of capitalism, which peeped occasionally from the glossy
pages of six-month-old issues of Vogue or Burda, and sometimes its
bright colors flashed in our eyes through the cracks in the Berlin wall,
together with a package of perfumed Tampax or a pair of blue jeans.
(As Slavenka Drakulic put it in How We Survived Communism and
Even Laughed, Communism failed, if for no other reason, because for
more than seventy years of existence it could not invent and provide
tampons and sanitary napkins.)
Mariana Katzarova, Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern
Europe and the Former Soviet Union, NATION, July 26, 1993, at 4 (Book Review). See
also infra notes 167-69.
167. Judit Kiss, The Second 'No': Women in Hungary, 39 FEMINIST REv. 49, 55
(1991). See also Maria Adamik, Hungary: A Loss of Rights?, 39 FEMINST Rav. 166
(1991). On the issue of the commodification of human emotions, see A Division of
Hallmark Cards Inc. is Making Progress Toward Establishing a Licensing Agree-
ment in Hungary, KANsAS CITY Bus. J., Nov. 4, 1994.
168. Edith Oltay, Prostitution Thriving in Hungary, 2 RFE/RL RESEARCH RPoRT,
No. 22, May 28, 1993. Increased prostitution is linked to economic hardship, which
in turn is linked to privatization. Many prostitutes are under the age of 18. The sex
industry has grown exponentially since 1989. Id.
169. Elzbieta Matynia, Women After Communism: A Bitter Freedom, 61 Soc. REs.
351, 366-67. Among Eastern European women, there is some disdain for western
feminists doing research projects in the East and offering their "expertise" to wo-
men's groups in the east. Id. See also DRAiLc, supra note 46, at Ch. 13.
170. " "The change of system was very bad for Gypsies. Now whenever someone
has to be sacked it's always the Gypsy but that was impossible then [under state
socialism]. The economic situation is getting worse and worse and we cannot pay the
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Almost every other social indicator in Hungary points to a
worsened and worsening situation in the post-revolutionary period.
In Budapest the crime rate has doubled in the last five years.171
This is also a direct effect of post-1989 economic reforms.172 Espe-
cially disturbing is the recent explosion of racially-motivated
crimes. 17 3 Environmental pollution is one of the worst legacies of
state socialism. Recent reports, however, suggest that pollution is
at least as bad and perhaps actually worse due to the new free mar-
ket system. 174 Ironically, only Hungary's traditionally high suicide
rent,' said Jozsef Bader, the Gypsy Duke of Eger." Adam Lebor, Hungary Hones
Creed of Hate, TIms, Aug. 14, 1993. Gypsies are disproportionately hurt by poverty.
By 1993, 81% of Gypsy households lived below the poverty line. Rudolf Andorka,
Hungary: Disenchantment After Transition, WoRLD TODAY, Dec., 1994, at 233. In
Hungary, Gypsies and Jews are the only numerically significant ethnic minorities.
This is primarily because approximately 50,000 Hungarian Gypsies and 565,000
Hungarian Jews were murdered by the fascist Arrow Cross government and the Ger-
man military during the Second World War. See George Jahn, Fearful Memories
Still Haunt Budapest Square, L.A. TMEms, July 10, 1994, at A16. Today about one
percent of the population is Jewish, and about five percent is Gypsy. The other East-
ern European countries, notably the former Yugoslavia and some of the Central
Asian Republics, provide obvious examples of resurgent persecution of ethnic minori-
ties. Homosexuality is not accepted in Hungarian society, regardless of the regime
in power or the nature of the economic system. See Miles Graham & Christian Hep-
pinstall, Hungary: Gays Still Ostracized in Post-Communist Era, INTER PRESS SER-
VICE, June 9, 1992.
171. Crime Doubled in Budapest Since the Fall of Communism, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, Oct. 8, 1994 (from Duna Satellite Service, Budapest), available in
NEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File. "In 1993 alone the number of crimes in Bu-
dapest reached 133,000. There were 665 crimes committed for every 10,000 resi-
dents of the capital and this was 1.5 times the national average." Id. See also David
Rocks, Democracy Fuels Crime; E. Europe Becoming as Unsafe as Other Places, Cm.
Tam., Nov. 26, 1993, at 9. The title of this article is misleading, and exemplifies how
the western press often confuse the terms "democracy" and "free markets." A more
accurate headline would instead read "Economic Reform Fuels Crime." "White-col-
lar crime, tax fraud and organized crime - none of which was widespread before 1989
- are all increasing rapidly. In Hungary, for example, experts estimate that financial
crimes have grown sixfold in the last four years." Id.
172. According to police in Budapest, rising crime is a result of hard economic
times. Caren Chesler & Bruce Holmes, Murder Rate Surges as Year Comes to End,
BUDAPEST SuN, Jan. 5-11, 1995, at 2.
173. The most common victims of hate crimes in Hungary are Gypsies, Jews, and
Africans. See Lebor, supra note 170, for a discussion of anti-Gypsy violence. The
upsurge in this type of crime is directly related to economic hardships caused by the
post-1989 liberalization of the economy, One other recent and recurring hate crime
is the continuing desecration of the Jewish cemetery in Budapest. Almost all of the
mausoleums have been robbed, and swastikas are spray-painted onto them. (Re-
search and observations of the author and Dave Holtan.)
174. An environmental crisis was created by the socialist governments' obsession
with heavy industry. The focal point of the harm is at the intersection of the Czech,
Polish, and German borders. Unfortunately, capitalism has done little or nothing to
improve environmental conditions:
The onset of capitalism has not cleaned the region's foul air, soil, or
water. But its instruments are now measuring it. The stark message
of the sensors is that almost five years after the collapse of Commu-
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rate (the highest in the world) has remained unaffected by the eco-
nomic upheaval. 175 Public opinion surveys show that eighty-seven
percent of Hungarians now believe they are worse off or about as
well off as they were five years ago.1 76 Seventy-three percent of the
population expects the country's economic situation to either stay
the same or continue to deteriorate.i7T Another survey found that
Hungarians clearly preferred the old socialist economy over the cur-
rent economy. They even ranked the old socialist economy as being
slightly better than the economy that they expect will exist five
years from now.1 78 The dominant opinion now, after five years of
reform, is that capitalism is a "fast track to easy riches for a privi-
leged and corrupt few."179
nism, the region's environment continues to decay. Chemical works,
smelters, coal mines and power plants are still infusing air and water
with waste far surpassing international standards and causing severe
health problems. Toxic dumps go on poisoning ground water and cities
keep on spewing their raw sewage into rivers. What's more, capitalism
is bringing its own problems - more traffic pollution, less public trans-
portation, more plastic foam, more clashes between environmentalists
and the peddlers of consumerism.
Simons, supra note 94. See also Sam Loewenberg, Pollution Slows Down Privatiza-
tion, BUDAPEST WK., July 21-27, 1994, at 6. "But environmental problems are a low
priority for privatization agencies under a mandate to privatize state-owned land
and industries as fast as possible to generate income for their cash-strapped coun-
tries." Id. See also Debora MacKenzie, Experts Clean Up as Eastern Europe Stays
Dirty, NEw ScmNTIsT, Apr. 9, 1994, at 8 (describing the failure of western environ-
mental assistance).
175. Ian Traynor, Other Lives: A Countryside Full of Grim Reapers, GUAlWIAN,
June 4, 1994, at 27. According to the World Health Organization, the incidence of
suicide in Hungary is 40 per 100,000 population, the world's highest. Id.
176. Craig R. Whitney, East Europe's Hard Path to a New Day, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept.
30, 1994, at Al (reporting Gallup Hungary Ltd. survey conducted from July 8 to 12,
1994, with 1,000 adults in Hungary. The poll had a margin of error of plus or minus
three percentage points). See also McKinsey, supra note 4. "Average Hungarians
feel acutely that they are paying a harsh price for the centre-right government's
mismanagement of the transition to capitalism." Id.
177. Whitney, supra note 176.
178. Richard Rose & Christian Haerpfer, Mass Response to Transformation in
Post-Communist Societies, 46 EuaoPE-AsiA STUD. 15 (1994). Not only did Hungari-
ans indicate a preference for the socialist economy, they also ranked the old state
socialist government higher than the current government. They did, however, be-
lieve that the government in five years time would be superior to the old socialist
government. Id. at 23. An overwhelming majority of Hungarians (86%) "said that a
secure job was far more important to them now than the freedom to travel or the
richness of consumer choice that they have enjoyed since communism collapsed."
Whitney, supra note 176.
179. Don't Lose Faith in Freedom, BUDAPEST WI-, Sept. 22-28, 1994, at 8 (edito-
rial). See also McKinsey, supra note 4.
'Everybody should pay a price, but it looks like only we are paying the
price for this transition," said Karoly, one of the 500 desparately poor
people who eat lunch in the Red Cross's soup kitchen in the Seventh
District [of Budapest] every day. "Just look around at who is building
new houses for themselves. These are all the people in power now,"
Law and Inequality
The free market reforms introduced since 1989 have strongly
magnified income inequality in Hungary. There was income ine-
quality under state socialism, but the disparity was never as
profound as now.' 80 Most empirical studies have shown that the
distribution of income in Eastern European countries, including
Hungary, under state socialism was more equal than in Western
countries during the same time period.181 Before the free market
revolution, the average income of the poorest segment of the popu-
lation was approximately sixty-two percent of median income, and
the income ratio between the top and bottom deciles was only 2.6
(in contrast to the United States, where a decile ratio of 8.9 reflects
enormous income inequality).12 By 1993, Hungary's decile ratio
said Karoly, a 47-year-old disabled man who must get by on a pension
of 6,200 forints ($89) a month.
Id. 'Western business tycoons and cell-phone carrying opportunists have not won
much affection in the hearts of ordinary Hungarians, for whom the only tangible
effects of the free market are rising prices and dwindling welfare payments."
Hooker, supra note 132.
180. "[Tlhe distribution of income is worsening.... Today the vast majority of the
population in [Eastern European] countries are living in economic conditions which
are demonstrably worse than those under the inefficiencies of central planning."
KREGAL ET AL., supra note 16, at 12. See Robin Knight & Victoria Pope, Back to the
Future, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., May 23, 1994, at 40. "Today, the gap [in Hun-
gary] between rich and poor is 50 percent wider than it was in 1989." Id. See also
supra notes 2 and 4.
181. See generally A.N.D. McAuILEY, EcONoMIc WELFARE IN TiE SovIET UNION
(1979); F.L. PRYOR, PROPERTY & INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN COMMUNIST & CAPI-
TALIST NATIONS (1973); A.B. ATmNsoN & J. MiciLwRiGHT, ECONOMIC TRANSFORMA-
TION IN EASTERN EUROPE & THE DISTRmUTION OF INCOME (1992). Some studies have
claimed that inequality under state socialism was actually comparable to that of the
West, once non-income benefits were considered. Certain perks, like access to higher
education, travel, access to foreign currency, better housing, and so on, were more
readily available to communist party officials. These studies don't seem to recognize
that other types of social income in kind, such as basic education, vacations, and
health care were more evenly distributed than in the West. These studies also fail to
recognize that much of the income inequality in Hungary from the period 1968-1989
was induced by market reforms, especially the growth of private enterprise in the
1980s. See ALEC NovE, THE ECONoMICS OF FEASIBLE SOCIALISM REVISTED, 137
(1991) (suggesting this possibility). See also UNICEF, supra note 138, at 4. "In the
years immediately preceding the introduction of economic reforms, the countries of
Eastern Europe undeniably boasted substantially lower levels of income inequality
and poverty rates than those prevailing in the majority of the middle income and
developed countries. [This observation] remains true even if account is taken of the
privileges of the nomenklatura." Id.
182. Hungarian figures are from Anthony B. Atkinson & John Micklewright, The
Distribution of Income in Eastern Europe, EUTI WORKING PAPER ECO No. 92/87, Eu-
ROPEAN UNIVERSITY INsTrruTE'S WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS, 1992, at 10. The
decile ratio measures the individual distribution of household per capita income.
The income of the top decile is divided by that of the bottom decile. The decile ratio
of 2.6 is from 1982. Between the years 1970-1986, the Hungarian decile ratio never
varied from the range 2.4 to 2.6. Id. Figures for the United States decile ratio are
from UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEvELOPMENT REPORT,
197 (1992). The United States income ratio is between the top 20% and bottom 20%
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had more than doubled, to 5.8, reflecting a huge growth in income
inequality over a very short time.183 This growing inequality will
have profoundly negative consequences in Hungary. First, as in-
come inequality grows, the stability of a democracy decreases.184
This is especially true in countries like Hungary where democracy
has only recently been established.185 Notably, the increase in so-
cial tensions related to rising inequality could cause the collapse of
the reform process entirely. Further, the benefits of expanded polit-
ical freedom that may or may not coexist with the new market econ-
omy will be substantially meaningless to most people, because of
the enormous new disparities. Also, as income inequality rises,
more people will become alienated and either withdraw from the
economy or reduce their efforts in it, causing economic performance
to decline.186
In the rush to set up capitalism through privatization and for-
eign investment, however, protecting those people hurt by the re-
form process has been an afterthought in parliament.18 7 By the
summer of 1994, social conditions had become so intolerable that
Hungarians voted the Socialist Party back into power with a large
majority of the seats in parliament.18 8 Hungarians thought they
of households over the years 1980-1988. Id. This suggests that the real decile ratio
in the United States is higher.
183. Andorka, supra note 170, at 233.
184. See generally Edward N. Muller, Democracy, Economic Development, and In-
come Inequality, 53 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV., at 50 (1988) (arguing that strong income
inequality destabilizes democracies).
185. See Agence France Presse, supra note 161 (describing a Council of Europe
report warning that market reforms are destroying new democratic institutions in
Eastern Europe). "The drive to market reforms in eastern Europe must be re-
strained if the massive growth in poverty is not to pose a serious threat to democracy
in the region." Id.
186. Amos Witztum, Privatization, Distribution and Economic Justice: Efficiency
in Transition, in PRIVATIZATION IN CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE 92 (Saul Estrin, ed.
1994).
187. See Nadori, supra note 51.
188. The reconstituted Socialist Party found enormous electoral success in the
summer of 1994. The socialist party now commands an absolute majority in parlia-
ment (209 of 386 seats) and is the dominant partner in a coalition with the Free
Democrats. The party has publicly committed to a course of privatization and mar-
ket reforms quite similar to those introduced by the center-right Democratic Forum,
which it replaced. See Myers, supra note 4. (The Democratic Forum governed
through a center-right coalition from 1990-94.) The following is explanatory of why
the socialists were brought back to power in the summer 1994 elections:
Last week, a 71-year-old Hungarian woman recounted an incident at a
drug store to explain why she voted for the former Communists. She
had seen an old man who was shaking violently but asked for only a
fraction of the medicine he needed because that was all the money he
had. The woman took the pharmacist aside and secretly paid for the
medicine herself. She hadn't seen such a thing in decades, she said, her
face filled with anger, and she has no desire to see it now.
1995]
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were voting in this election for an alternative to the disastrous mar-
ket policies of 1990-1994, and expected the resurrected Socialist
Party to put the brakes on free market reforms in order to protect
jobs and social welfare. They were in for an ugly surprise, however,
when the newly elected socialist government revealed that it had no
intention of slowing privatization or foreign investment.18 9 This
proved that the new "successor" to the HSWP is as uninterested in
popular opinion now as it was when it ruled Hungary from 1948-
1989.190 Hungarians are now governed by what is arguably the
most right-wing socialist party in human history.191
1MI. The Persistence of a Failed Model of Reform
If the social cost of free market reforms is so devastating, why
has not Hungary's new socialist government abandoned these poli-
cies? Obviously, Hungarian elites benefit from privatization
through foreign investment, and therefore have a built-in bias to-
ward maintaining this project. 192 There are three additional phe-
nomena that bind Hungary and Eastern Europe to the failed
project of radical privatization: the unhelpful nature of coercive
western aid programs; the policies of the International Monetary
Fund; and free market ideology. These factors are substantially
interwoven.
(a) Western Aid Programs
There are many manifestations of western aid to the region,
but most assistance is ideological,193 promotes or is contingent
Myers, supra note 4, at C1. "There is no denying that.. .the pro-market political
parties [in Poland and Hungary] associated with the International Monetary Fund -
World Bank 'shock therapy' approach, have accomplished something unimaginable
in 1989: making large numbers of people nostalgic for the old Communist economic
order." Robert McIntyre, A Look at the Communist Comeback, WASH. PosT, June 12,
1994, at C3.
189. "Despite their roots in the old communist party the Socialist technocrats
promise an almost Thatcherite economic programme designed to speed up privatiza-
tion, cut spending and encourage foreign investment." Lucy Hooker, European Busi-
ness: Little Yellow Chick Fails to Fly as Hungary Cancels Expo 96, GUARDIAN, July
30, 1994, at 7.
190. See generally Andrds Korosdnyi, Intellectuals and Democracy in Eastern Eu-
rope, 65 POL. Q. 415 (1994) (arguing that Hungarian intellectuals, including socialist
party elites, either dislike democracy or are ambivalent to it).
191. Id. See also supra note 47.
192. See supra notes 47, 49, 50 and 91 and accompanying text.
193. Mark Neufeld, West's Bankers Could Send Russia to the Brink, ToRoNTo
STAR, Aug. 12, 1992, at A19. "The human costs of restructuring East European econ-
omies in accordance with free-market principles appears irrelevant to neo-conserva-
five ideologues in the West." Id.
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upon economic liberalization, 194 and does virtually nothing to im-
prove the lives of most Hungarians and other Eastern Europe-
ans.195 Fast-paced legal and economic reform to allow foreign
direct investment and privatization is encouraged and in some con-
texts demanded by the West. 196 What are these aid programs and
how exactly have they failed?
The United States inititated a large aid program immediately
after the HSWP gave up power in late 1989. The Support for East
European Democracy Act of 1989197 (SEED Act) was created to
support economic reform in Hungary and Poland. The SEED Act
has virtually nothing to do with supporting democracy in either
country.198 Its true objectives are, inter alia, "to promote the devel-
194. John Goshko, Detours on Painful Journey to Democracy, Free Markets Raise
Disenchantment in West, The WASH. PosT, May 23, 1992, at A27. "By now, almost
all of the U.S. aid money for Eastern Europe is directed at activities that foster
privatization or that support [foreign] investment and trade. About 40 percent goes
to 'enterprise funds' that are private boards set up by recipient countries to make
loans and offer technical assistance to small and medium-sized private businesses."
Id. Foreign aid generally is designed more to help the western countries giving the
aid than to help the developing countries receiving it. Hayter, supra note 97, at 83.
The "big bang" or "shock therapy" approach to economic reform was pushed on East-
ern European countries by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the
OECD, and other western institutions after 1989. Chakravarthi Raghavan, Cen-
tralIEastern Europe: Disarray and Discontent Dog Reform, Inter Press Service,
Apr. 7, 1995, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File. See also infra
note 227 and accompanying text.
195. In particular, western aid programs are not concerned with the distribution
of existing wealth or any new wealth that is created in Eastern Europe. "Western
experts do not devote appropriate attention to the distribution issues of the East
European transition, to the shocks that are expected in view of inequalities and pov-
erty." No Market Economy Without Social Justice, CDPP Chairman Says, MTI Hun-
garian News Agency, Sept. 25, 1994, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS
File. (The CDPP is the Christian Democratic People's Party, currently in opposition
in the parliament). "The claim of massive (in fact virtually non-existent) Western
aid to the transforming economies is pure public relations.... Much of the support
has actually been rechannelled to the donor countries, being used to cover the some-
times astronomically high costs of Western experts and advisors. In Hungary 90 per
cent of the PHARE programme has been in the form of so-called technical assistance,
covering the $1,000-per-day consultancy fees of 'foreigners temporarily stationed in
Hungary.'" Inotai, supra note 7, at 31.
196. See U.S. Assistance to Central and Eastern Europe, Hearing before the Sub-
committee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 102nd
Cong., 2nd Sess., June 3, 1992 (dialogue between Robert Barry and Rep. Tom Lantos
about privatization and foreign aid strategy). See also supra note 194.
197. Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
179, 103 Stat. 1298.
198. The U.S. government claims that about seven percent of SEED Act disburse-
ments to Hungary have gone to "strengthening democratic initiatives." U.S. assist-
ance to Central & Eastern Europe, supra note 196, at 116 (figure as of Mar. 31,
1992). This figure is misleading, however, because even some of the projects which
allegedly support "democratic initiatives" are actually subsidies for the creation of a
free market economy. All of the following are examples of these projects: Free Trade
Union Institute, Center for International Private Enterprise, paying SUNY to estab-
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opment of a free market economic system characterized by... dis-
mantlement of all wage and price controls... [and] liberalization of
investment and capital, including the repatriation of profits by for-
eign investors... "199 Twenty-five of twenty-seven sections in sub-
stantive titles of the SEED Act provide for economic reform or
economic assistance, while only one section has anything to do with
"democracy," and one is about "cultural" exchanges. 20 0 The United
States government views the SEED Act primarily as a vehicle for
promoting American corporate interests in Hungary.20
Even viewed for what it really is, a program of economic re-
form, the SEED Act is a failure. The United States Agency for In-
ternational Development (USAID) disburses to American
companies and law firms the millions of dollars that Congress has
authorized under the SEED Act through fiscal year 1995.202 Most
of the SEED money, however, is used to develop these companies'
business connections in Hungary, rather than helping Hungari-
ans.20 3 "The real winners in AID's foray into the region [Eastern
Europe] have been the [American] companies, law firms, and ac-
counting firms that have quickly gotten a piece of the new post-com-
munist pork."20 4 USAID has paid contractors to find overseas
lish chambers of commerce in two cities, and English language instruction. Id. at
109.
199. SEED Act, supra note 197, at § 2(b) (emphasis added).
200. Id. at § 1.
201. The following is testimony from a congressional hearing about American aid
to Eastern Europe. Robert Barry was the State Department's special advisor to the
Deputy Secretary for Eastern European Assistance at the time:
MR. BARRY:... Again, there are domestic political problems in many
countries about resentment of foreign capital coming in. Somehow
these attitudinal problems, I think, have to be dealt with, and we are
trying to do this through a form of using our media, using USIA, using
joint cooperative television shows, for example, to show that foreign in-
vestment in Southeast Asia or foreign investment in other parts of the
world can be very beneficial for the recipient countries. So that's the
kind of attitudinal problem I think we have to attack.
U.S. Assistance to Central and Eastern Europe, supra note 196, at 52.
202. Julie Kim, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary: Recent Develop-
ments, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE IsSUE BRIEF, Oct. 4, 1994, at 16. As of
October 1993, Hungary had received over 152 million dollars of SEED Act money.
P.L. 103-306, H.R. 4426 was signed into law on August 23, 1994, and provided for
359 million dollars in SEED Act funds to Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, plus
69.2 million dollars for the European Bank for Reconstuction and Development. Id.
203. Sheila Kaplan, Contracting Problems, Management Woes Plague Aid in the
Ex-Communist Block; Many Agency Projects Seem More Like Aid to U.S. Law Firms
and Other Companies Than to the Emerging Democracies, LEGAL TIMs, May 31,
1993, at 1. Douglas Hellinger, of the Development Gap: "These AID contracts raise
the very real question of whether our assistance programs in Eastern Europe and
Russia are designed to help these countries move forward on a more self-reliant path
or if, in fact, our goal is to push forth U.S. investment." Id.
204. Id. at 1. See also Georgie Anne Geyer, Big Help; U.S. Consultants Eat Up
Foreign Aid, PHOENIX GAzETrE, Mar. 19, 1994.
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investment opportunities for an American company, overlooked po-
tential conflicts of interest by firms representing clients that do
business with the same governments that USAID is paying them to
advise,2O5 illegally failed to use competitive bidding in the con-
tracting process, and wasted hundreds of thousands of dollars of
SEED Act money paying American law firms to provide services
that other organizations are performing free.206 American busi-
nesses and consulting firms are tripping over each other to get a
piece of the SEED Act pie and these firms are on the lookout for
overseas business. 207 The conflicts of interest danger is especially
pronounced in USAID's contracts with American law firms. SEED
Act money has already underwritten more than a dozen American
law firms who advise the governments of Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union. Typically, these firms also represent western
businesses interested in investing in the region. The resulting dan-
ger is, of course, that state-owned enterprises on the auction block
will be undersold to the detriment of the selling country. In Hun-
gary, "the selling of Hungarian companies to foreign firms at un-
fairly cheap prices has generated so much adverse publicity that
the government established a new privatization agency to supervise
the privatization process."208
Of the SEED Act's initial disbursements in 1989, one of the
largest was a sixty million dollar grant to support the Hungarian-
American Enterprise Fund (HAEF). This is a quasi-private organi-
zation created by the SEED Act, designed to help private firms in
Hungary get off the ground.209 The head of the Hungarian govern-
205. Janine R. Wedel, Polish Officials Sour on US AD Approach, CTIRAN Sci-
ENC. MOTrrOR, Mar. 2, 1992, at 18. "A potential conflict of interest lies in the fact
that Western consulting firms doing asset valuations are often the same firms help-
ing other clients to buy at the prices these Western firms help set. This undercuts
the full value of East European properties." Id.
206. Id.
207. Ian Traynor, When the East's Dreams Evaporate, GUARDIN, Nov. 19, 1994.
"The same criticisms are levelled at the western aid programmes, which have func-
tioned as work and wealth creation schemes for western companies setting up opera-
tions in the east. Washington's USAID [SEED Act] programmes, which disburses
hundreds of millions of dollars in assistance and advisory work, doles out funds al-
most exclusively to US companies in the region." Id. at 16.
208. Jack Kaikati, Privatization in Eastern Europe: Lessons from the Hungarian
Experience, Mm-ATLANmc J. Bus., Dec., 1992, at 213. The extent to which American
law firms are complicit in underselling state enterprises in Hungary in still unclear,
because USAID does not require its SEED Act contractors to disclose their clients.
Senator David Pryor said that "the truth is that the taxpayers are paying for con-
tractors who are working both sides of the street." Kaplan, supra note 203.
209. Typical of the Fund's deals was a three million dollar investment of tax-
payer's SEED Act money into an equity stake in the Hungarian franchiser of Dun-
kin' Donuts, Kentucky Fried Chicken, and Pizza Hut. The former Managing
Director of the Fund, Charles Huebner, defended this decision by claiming that not
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ment's State Holding Company (one of the agencies responsible for
privatizing state enterprises) was forced to resign in 1993 after it
was discovered that the United States government, through the
HAEF, was "supplementing" his salary at the rate of 130,000 dol-
lars per year.21o
In 1993 the U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations
Committee issued a scathing review that "accused the fund of mis-
management and of violating a slew of guidelines by investing four
million dollars in a small banking firm [EurAmerical that pays its
managers annual salaries of almost 400,000 dollars."211 The HAEF
created EurAmerica to avoid USAID oversight in setting up SEED
Act programs. 212
The European Union's version of the SEED Act is called
PHARE, and has been, by most accounts, moderately more benefi-
cial than American assistance. Even PHARE aid, however, focuses
too much on bankrolling western experts, 213 to the detriment of the
actual needs of the recipient countries.2 14 The Hungarian Ministry
of Agriculture has complained that "one-third of all PHARE aid for
Hungarian agriculture went to foreign consultancy companies
whose studies were virtually useless... "215 The aid is "not suffi-
ciently directed towards improving the population's standard of liv-
only will it create thousands of jobs in Budapest, it will also generate "people who
will now know how to wash, how not to smell, how to smile, how to be fast." Henry
Copeland, Finance: Uncle Sam's Helping Hand Pockets the Change, Inter Press Ser-
vice, Apr. 26, 1993, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, ARCNWS File. Creating
the new capitalist man (or woman) will apparently be the crowning achievement of
American aid efforts in this part of the world.
210. Head of State Holding Company Resigns, MTI Hungarian News Agency,
June 18, 1993, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
211. Peter Maass, Congressman Charges Aid Effort Goes Awry; Hungary Enter-
prise Fund Pays Fat Salaries, WASH. PosT, July 29, 1993, at A15.
212. Copeland, supra note 209. See also Henry Copeland, A Bit Too Enterprising?
US. Funds for East Europe Stir Criticism, INT. HERALD Tam., Apr. 17, 1993, avail-
able in NEXIS, NEWS Library, ARCNWS File. Congressman David Obey (D-WI),
Chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee on foreign assistance, claims
that the enterprise funds "have been treated with kid gloves because of the political
connections of their board chairman and I think that needs to come to a screeching
halt.'" Id. A US-AID officer says that the funds are "run as fiefdoms with no ac-
countability to the American people." Id.
213. Stephen Nisbet, EU Prepares for Expanded Links with East Europe, REUTER
EuR. Bus. REP., Mar. 16, 1994, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
"The EU's notoriously inefficient PHARE assistance programme funds EU firms al-
most exclusively." Traynor, supra note 207.
214. EC: Eastern European Criticism of Functioning of PHARE and TACIS
Programmes, Reuter Textline, Agence Europe, June 11, 1993, available in NEXIS,
NEWS Library, CURNWS file.
215. PHARE-Funded Studies Criticized, MTI Hungarian News Agency, Feb. 1,
1994, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File. Gyorgy Rasko, State Sec-
retary at the Agriculture Ministry noted, on the other hand, that some other PHARE
programs in Hungary were helpful. Id.
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ing."216 PHARE programs throughout Eastern Europe are also
widely regarded as environmentally damaging.217 (One notorious
example of PHARE "assistance" to Eastern Europe was the ship-
ment of extremely poisonous pesticides, banned in the West, to Po-
lish farmers. The PHARE program made no attempt to explain or
structure their possible uses.)218 Even PHARE assistance explic-
itly directed to environmental renewal projects has usually been
squandered on over-paid western consultants or else used in a way
that "solve[s] one 'environmental problem while creating
another."219
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD), modeled on the World Bank, was created in 1990 to help
speed economic reform by loaning money to private and public
projects in the East. Unfortunately, as of 1993, the bank "had spent
more on internal costs-in particular, its glamorous marble-and-
mirrored headquarters in London-than it had disbursed in East-
ern Europe."220 A glaring example of this waste was the construc-
tion of the "now infamous $1.1 million Carrara marble elevator
bank."221 Lawyers from the EBRD's large legal department are
helping to build the foundations for capitalism by suggesting new
business-friendly laws. They once wrote a draft that became the
basis for proposed legislation in Hungary.222 There is an obvious
216. Id. See also PHARE Slammed by Auditors, E. EUR. MARKETS, Nov. 26, 1993.
217. Rob McLean, Deputies Criticize PHARE Program, UPI, Apr. 22, 1994, avail-
able in NEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File. See also supra note 174.
218. Id. Du Pont de Nemours International, perhaps along with Monsanto and
other American agro-chemical companies, played a large role in this fiasco. This is
another typical example of the impact of western capital in Eastern Europe Poland:
Du Pont in Poland, GAZETA BANKOWA, Dec. 9, 1990, available in NEXIS, NEWS Li-
brary, ARCNWS File. Greenpeace has recently accused the PHARE program, the
World Bank, and various multinationals including Monsanto, of collaborating to
force poisonous pesticides on the Albanian government. Greenpeace Urges Recall of
Pesticides Sent to Albania, Blasts EU Agricultural Aid, BNA INT'L ENVIRON. DAILY,
Oct. 27, 1994, available in NEXIS, WORLD Library, ALLWLD File.
219. MacKenzie, supra note 174.
220. Emily Barker, Starting from Scratch, AM. LAWYER, June 1994, at 42. The
EBRD is now derisively referred to by many as the "European Bank for Redecorating
and Designing." It has been calculated, as well, that the cost of the new marble-
coated bank headquarters would feed a queue of eighty Russian women for approxi-
mately 232 years. Id. See also Paolo Miurin & Andrea Sommariva, Financial and
Technical Assistance to Central and Eastern Europe: A Critical Appraisal of the Role
of International Institutions, WASH. Q., Summer, 1994, at 91.
221. Barker, supra note 220, at 42. As of 1993, the EBRD had probably done
more to subsidize Italian marble cutters than help Eastern Europeans. More recent
reports suggest the EBRD's "governors... have not yet lost their penchant for high
living... " John Roberts, Finance - Eastern Europe: EBRD Role to be Discussed at
London Meet, Inter Press Service, Apr. 8, 1995, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library,
CURNWS File.
222. Barker, supra note 220, at 42.
1995]
Law and Inequality
potential for conflicts-of-interest inherent in this practice. EBRD
lawyers have written the business laws for East European govern-
ments and are simultaneously advising clients about investments
in these same countries.
The record of the SEED Act and other foreign aid to Hungary
is clear. These are projects calculated to advance western foreign
investment in Hungary, clothed as foreign aid programs. Western
aid to Hungary thus far has also been characterized by high levels
of mismanagement and the self-promotion and profiteering of west-
ern firms. Given these facts, one must wonder if there is any value
at all in Western aid? Perhaps, aid from the United States and
Western Europe is not designed to benefit Hungary at all. "Truly
effective aid for Eastern Europe can threaten the West's own manu-
facturing base and adversely affect living standards."223 It is at
least conceivable that western governments foresaw this in 1989
and structured aid accordingly. 224
(b) The International Monetary Fund
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) are
heavily involved in the Hungarian reform process.225 Western gov-
ernments dominate both institutions,226 and the IMF to a large de-
223. Rune Bech, Great Pain in Place of a Plan, GuARDLAN, January, 10, 1992, at
23. See also infra note 292 and accompanying text.
224. The most likely explanation for Western involvement is related to foreign
policy concerns. Early American aid (the SEED Act, for example) was granted at a
time when the Soviet Union still existed and the Bush Administration wanted to
invite Hungary and Poland into binding Western economic structures as quickly as
possible in order to prevent them from ever going back to the CMEA and the Warsaw
Pact. This promised to hasten the destruction of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe
as well. Bush went to Hungary and Poland in 1989, and made a big deal of announc-
ing massive aid for those countries in order to send a signal to Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, and the rest, encouraging them to join the revolution and implicitly sig-
naling that they would be rewarded if they did. When the Soviet Union dis-
integrated, and thus the Warsaw Pact along with it, initial Western generosity
diminished.
225. Hungary joined the IMF in 1982. See Hungary Earns IMF Support, FIN.
Tns, May 10, 1982, at 14. Hungary joined the World Bank in 1983-84. (Not to be
outdone by the EBRD, the construction of the new World Bank headquarters in
Washington, D.C. recently ran 83 million dollars over budget, hardly a practice in
keeping with the strict austerity measures the Bank insists upon for Third World
economies.) George Graham, Red Faces at World Bank as HQ Costs Break Budget,
FIN. TiMEs, July 16, 1993, at 4.
226. The World Bank and IMF were created at the Bretton Woods conference in
1944 in order to maintain and elaborate western hegemony in the world economy.
Hayter, supra note 97, at 88. They were ostensibly created to assist developing
countries with loans and monetary policy. The World Bank and IMF are related
institutions (membership in the IMF is required for membership in the World Bank).
Traditionally, the head of the World Bank is nominated by the President of the
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gree determines the Hungarian government's economic policies.227
International financial institutions, the EBRD and IMF included,
demanded privatization as a condition for financial assistance.228
Western financial institutions (IMF and EBRD) and govern-
ments have promised a total of about twenty-seven billion dollars of
assistance to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Only fourteen
percent of this is grants, the rest is mainly loans and credit guaran-
tees.2 29 To get these loans and credits, however, Hungary must
maintain a good credit rating in the international lending commu-
nity and world bond markets. This credit rating depends on
whether the IMF has given its blessing to the Hungarian budget.
In 1992, the World Bank threatened to refuse to disburse any more
loans until Hungary came to an agreement with the IMF on its next
budget.23 0 Hungary, therefore, cannot afford to ignore IMF de-
mands for budget cuts if it wants to integrate into the West. Unfor-
tunately for Hungary's poor and unemployed, the IMF consistently
demands sharp cuts in social spending as a precondition for a
favorable credit rating.
Although free-market devotees like the IMF and World Bank
have generally praised Hungary's moves to slash subsidies and
liberalize prices, average Hungarians are paying the price in
the form of double-digit inflation, 12 percent unemployment
and a sharp polarization between haves and have-nots. 2 3 1
United States and is an American citizen. Traditionally, the head of the IMF is a
Western European. The United States, Japan, Germany, France and Britain are the
largest contributors and therefore account for about 40% of the voting power in both
institutions. See Waldon Bello & Shea Cunningham, Reign of Error: The World
Bank's Wrongs, DOLLARS AND SENSE, SeptlOct. 1994, at 12.
227. "The IMF is the central nervous system of the international monetary mar-
ket... [and] Hungary's standing... depends largely on how the IMF views the Hun-
garian economy." Christopher Condon, Economic Tune-Ups May No Longer Be
Enough, BUDAPEST WK., Nov. 3-9, 1994, at 10. In fairness to the free market reform-
ers, it must be noted that Hungary is now beholden to western financial institutions
in large part because the former state socialist government ran up a twenty billion
dollar foreign debt. MICHAEL BuRAwoy & JANOS LUKAcs, THE RADIANT PAST: IDEOL-
oGy & REArrv IN HUNGARY's ROAD To CAPrrAISM 170 (1992). See also Angus MacK-
innon, Commission Warns Hungary to Stick to Reform Programme, Agence France
Presse, Feb. 9, 1995, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File (reporting
that the European Commission requires privatization and other reforms as a precon-
dition for Hungarian membership in the European Union).
228. Judy Batt, Political Dimensions of Privatization in Eastern Europe, in PRivA.
TIZATioN IN CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE 89 (Saul Estrin, ed. 1994).
229. ECONOMIST, supra note 146.
230. World Bank Loan Depends on IMFApproval of Hungary's Budget, MT Hun-
garian News Agency, Sept. 15, 1992, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, ARCNWS
File.
231. Hungarian Finance Minister Jumps to Avoid Being Pushed, GUARDIAN, Feb.
12, 1993, at 9.
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In this way, the IMF's actions in Hungary ignore the social costs of
transition and contribute to growing inequalities in Hungary.232
In late 1994, the IMF director personally instructed the Hun-
garian government to cut back on social welfare expenditures. 23 3
This advice may seem odd, coming at a time when so many people
face poverty and unemployment (due in part to the very policies
that the IMF and other western financial institutions advocate) and
thus rely on public assistance to meet basic needs, but this demand
is typical of IMF austerity measures forced upon Hungary and
other countries as a precondition for World Bank loans.234
In early 1995, the IMF again demanded that Hungary reduce
its budget.23 5 The Finance Ministry complied by announcing large
cuts in social spending2 36 only a day before the beginning of sched-
232. KREGEL ET AL., supra note 16, at 114. The IMF is generally concerned with
purely numerical or scientific calculations of the health of a society and is generally
unconcerned with distributional issues:
The main mistake is that IMF-type programmes give more weight to
three single measures: (1) The stabilization of the currency, (2) price
deregulation as well as elimination of State intervention, and (3) priva-
tization. Their immediate and radical implementation has not halted
the fall in production and employment. It is a serious mistake to be-
lieve that a set of three measures alone can create a socio-economic con-
text in which the single agents, by the pursuit of their private interest,
add to their own benefit and to that of society. On the contrary, 'shock
therapy' adds more damage to the socio-economic context that already
exists.
Id. See also UNICEF, supra note 138.
233. Jane Perlez, Living too High in Hungary; Leadership Shies From Belt-Tight-
ening Despite Warnings of Severe Problems, INT'L HERALD Tam., Oct. 27, 1994. "The
Hungarian government is under pressure from the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank to curb its generous social spending, especially family benefits."
Id. Kitty McKinsey, Hungary Pressed to Trim Social Welfare; Mothers Afraid They'll
Lose an Important Part of their Family Incomes, GAzErr (Montreal), Dec. 19, 1994,
at B5. "Among the benefits the [IMF] says must be reviewed are the three kinds of
child support payments families receive on the birth of a child; pensions starting at
55 years of age for women and 62 for men; unemployment benefits that begin imme-
diately upon leaving school and last for one year ofjoblessness; and generous pay-
ments for medicine." Perlez, supra, Oct. 27, 1994.
234. IMF policies in Eastern Europe are substantially the same as those the IMF
has forced upon the rest of the developing world.
Typically, they include the following elements: a) reductions in govern-
ment expenditures on social programs such as health and education; b)
restrictive labor policies, involving wage reductions and layoffs; c) end-
ing of subsidies/price controls for basic foodstuff; and d) reform of other
tax structure to redistribute wealth from lower-income to higher in-
come groups (in accordance with the dictum that "the poor don't work
because they have too much, while the rich don't work because they
have too little").
Neufeld, supra note 193.
235. IMF Wants Further Cuts in Hungary Deficits, REuTER Bus. REP., Feb. 24,
1995, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
236. These budget cuts of at least 100 million dollars will decrease the family al-
lowance and child benefits, lay-off university staff, and introduce tuition fees at
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uled talks with the IMF regarding a new loan-agreement for Hun-
gary.2 37 The Minister of Welfare resigned in protest over these
budget cuts, noting their effects on the poor in a country already
suffering from massive unemployment and growing poverty.238
Hungarian trade unions and the national Gypsy organization
threatened strikes if social spending was decreased as planned.
IMF demands are pushing Hungary to the brink of social unrest
and disorder. What is surprising, really, is how long people have
tolerated these yearly spending cuts and price increases.
(c) Ideology23 9
Market ideology240 dominates concepts of economic develop-
ment in Eastern Europe and has a negative impact on successful
development. 24 1 Market ideology is particularly powerful in the
context of the privatization process, 24 2 and colors all perceptions of
economic development strategies.
state-owned universities for the first time. Child benefits will cease to be a civic
right. Blaise Szolgyemy, Hungary Devalues Forint, will cut Social Spending, REu-
TER EuR. Bus. REP., Mar. 12, 1995, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS
File.
237. IMF Talks Begin on Monday, MTI Hungarian News Agency, Mar. 13, 1995,
available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
238. Government Austerity Measures, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Mar.
16, 1995, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
239. Ideology means "any set of ideas and values which has the social function of
consolidating a particular economic order." ScRuTON, supra note 11, at 213. A
similar formulation is a form of consciousness which "supports or justifies
reprehensible social institutions, unjust social practices, relations of exploitation,
hegemony, or domination." Raymond Geuss, Ideology, in TERRY EAGLETON,
IDE OLOGY 269 (1994). See also Tibor Szabo, The End and Renewal of Ideology in
Central Europe and in Hungary, 17 HIsTORY OF EUm. IDEAS 747 (1993) (generally
discussing the ideology of state socialism and more recent ideologies replacing it).
See also DERRICK K. GONDWE, POLrncAL ECONOMY, IDEOLOGY, AND THE IMPACT OF
ECONOMICS ON THE THIRD WORLD 31-55 (1992) (discussing ideology in economics).
240. "The most significant ideology [in Hungary], and one that was already notice-
able during the elections of 1990, is that of the market economy, synonymous with
support for capitalism." Szabo, supra note 239, at 751.
241. Robert Chote, Economics: One World, Different Solutions, INDEPENDENT,
Sept. 26, 1993. "Applying Western-style free market solutions in blanket fashion
throws up all sorts of problems. Bribing Eastern Europe into breakneck liberalisa-
tion may threaten the sustainabiity of capitalism in these countries by fostering
inequality on an unsustainable scale." Id. at 12.
242. Privatization is "an intensely political process and involves significant social
engineering, particularly in Eastern Europe." Lieberman, supra note 8, at 8. "The
push for privatization in East Europe arose largely from the infectious ideological
fervor of emissaries from Western organization, such as the World Bank and the
U.S. Agency for International Development." Phineas Baxandall, The Privatization
Myth, DOLLARS & SENSE, Jan./Feb. 1995, at 23. A recent letter to the editor in a
Budapest newspaper raised the ideology issue in the following way: "Or is the priva-
tization of everything just an ideology, which in the USA and Britain - and the IMF
and World Bank! - is accepted as not so efficient after all, having been exposed as a
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The early champions of reprivatization seemed to know and
care little about the actual distributive results of their pro-
grams. Regardless of their outcomes, these programs epitomize
their advocates' ideologies and, to the extent they are enacted,
the ideologies of the region's new governments. These new gov-
ernments assure the ideological intensity for their projects
when they claim to be polar opposites of the deposed socialist
regimes.... 2 4 3
Part of the power of this ideology derives from its advocates' success
in portraying privatization as a neutral and natural process. 244
Ideology also causes the means (privatization) of economic reform to
be mistakenly seen as the end itself.245 There is little evidence,
however, in the history of twentieth century economic development
that radical privatization and destruction of the state sector can
create economies that are more satisfactory than ones with a large
state sector.24 6 In fact, there is nothing inherently better about pri-
fraud that depresses economies, makes an elite stupidly rich and the poor ever
poorer?" Martin Baker, Why Privatize Everything?, BUDAPEST WK, Jan. 5-11, 1995,
at 7 (letter to the editor).
243. Anna Gelpern, The Laws and Politics of Reprivatization in East-Central Eu-
rope: A Comparison, 14 U. PA. J. INWL Bus. L. 315 (1993). Privatization was em-
braced by the new post-communist government of Eastern Europe in order to
"demonstrate both to their electorate and the international community how radically
different they [were] from their predecessors." Kiss, supra note 114, at 142.
244. A good example of this refusal to acknowledge the ideological content of
privatization and free market reforms is Jnos Kornai's book THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM
(see supra note 164). Throughout the almost 600 pages of text, the respected Hun-
garian economist and free market apologist Kornai describes in great detail and at-
tacks the ideological nature of state socialism, while never admitting the vital role
which ideology plays in capitalism and in capitalist development. Id. at 49-54 and
414-18. Furthermore, the legal literature on foreign investment overwhelmingly ig-
nores any discussion of the social welfare effects of foreign investment. A search of
the Infotrac/Legaltrac database found 1668 articles under the topic "foreign invest-
ment." Of those, only six were in the subtopic of "social aspects." Search of Infotrac/
Legaltrac CD ROM on Mar. 1, 1995 (database covering English language legal peri-
odicals from 1980 to Feb., 1995).
245. Rider, supra note 131, at 589. "Privatisation is a fetish of the era, as well as
a strange euphemism for an ideological crusade. It offers both negative and positive
potential. The danger is that it will merely create the conditions for massive in-
creases in inequality of income, wealth and power, and in the case of eastern and
central Europe enable foreign capital to obtain and/or cement control over national
economic and social policies, as well as create more fertile conditions for the 'mafi-
osation' of the State." Guy Standing, Restructuring for Distributive Justice in East-
ern Europe, INTERNATIoNAL LABOUR OFFICE, CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN TEAM,
BUDAPEST, Jan., 1993, at 16.
246. Postwar Japan and Germany did not rely on privatized economies to achieve
their economic successes. Both countries used strong state direction and state sector
employment to re-build after 1945. The history of economic development in the
South shows that relying on privatization is a mistake. In many cases, the World
Bank and IMF forced privatization on the governments of African, Asian, and Latin
American countries, where the state sector was often the engine of the development
process. Generally, the private sector failed to develop as promised and these coun-
tries faced even more economic deterioration after structural adjustment was im-
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vate ownership of the means of production as opposed to social own-
ership thereof.247
Western governments self-interestedly advocate for Eastern
Europe a level of privatization that they would never accept in their
own countries. (The state sector accounts for forty-two percent of
the Gross Domestic Product of the OECD248 countries.) 2 49 These
are hardly free market, laissez faire economies. The OECD coun-
tries do not admit the necessity of massive government intervention
in their own economies because if they were to do so they could not
enforce their privatization agenda throughout the developing
world. Privatization allows direct foreign investment and enor-
mous profit-taking by western companies, develops markets for
western goods, and entrenches a pattern of massive resource flows
back to western countries. 25 0
Western advisors and the bulk of the literature on post-1989
reform describe capitalism as a naturally occurring condition, 2 51 as
opposed to socialism, which they portray as an artificial imposi-
tion.25 2 Nothing could be less true. Both systems have at different
times and places been formulated in intensely ideological ways, and
both capitalism and socialism have existed as pragmatic economic
systems. The problem in Eastern Europe today is that a highly ide-
posed. See generally WALDEN BELLO & SHA CUNNINGHAM, DARK VICToRY: THE
U.S., STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, AND GLOBAL PovERTY (1994).
247. See BuRAwoY & LUKAcs, supra note 227, at 59-66 for a synopsis of this argu-
ment. The authors compare efficiency of production in two firms, one in America,
and the other in Hungary under state socialism. "Effective operations are compati-
ble with any system of ownership; examples of well-run nationalized enterprises are
as common as examples of inefficient, unprofitable private ones." Rider, supra note
131, at 589. See also Baev, supra note 8, at 6.
248. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development: an economic body
created in 1960 to help wealthy western countries become more wealthy. The follow-
ing states are members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.
249. Richard Parker, Clintonomics for the East; Eastern Europe, FOREIGN POL'Y.,
Mar. 22, 1994, at 53.
250. This resource flow was the result of structural adjustment programs imposed
on Third World countries by the IMF and World Bank. "The policy was immensely
successful [for the West], effecting as it did an astounding net transfer of $178 billion
from the Third World to commercial banks through loan repayments between 1984
and 1990. So massive was the decapitalization of the South that a former executive
director of the World Bank exclaimed: 'Not since the conquistadores plundered Latin
America has the world experienced a flow in the direction we see today.'" Bello &
Cunningham, supra note 226, at 11.
251. See generally ALICE H. AMSDEN ET. AL, THE MARKET MEETS ITS MATCH: RE-
STRUCTURING THE EcoNoMsuE oF EASTERN EUROPE (1995). See also Doug Henwood,
Bloc Busters: Free Market Fundamentalists Pray for Rain, VOICE LIT. Supp., March




ological and artificial form of socialism (state socialism 1947-1989)
is being replaced by an equally ideological version of capitalism.253
A related ideological problem is the confusion of the terms "democ-
racy" and "capitalism,"254 which mystifies the actual meaning of
each, and undermines successful transition.
The western press has reinforced the false dichotomy of state
socialism vs. capitalism, and presented these caricatures as if they
were the sole options for Eastern European policymakers.255 West-
ern governments and financial institutions (and their proxy local
elites in Eastern Europe) all reinforce the following conventional
wisdom about post-1989 reform:256 Homo sovieticus is an artificial
creature born of forty years of ideological coercion, who will become
253. See generally Bryant, supra note 100.
254. The common use of the term "democracy" together with "free enterprise"
mystifies the meaning of each and clouds policymaking processes. A recent check of
the NEXIS news library showed that, in stories after 1989 mentioning Eastern Eu-
rope or Hungary, "democracy" was uttered in the same breath as "capitalism" (or
some version thereof) more than four thousand times. This search was conducted in
the NEXIS NEWS Library, CURNWS and ARCNWS Files on Jan. 14, 1995 with the
search phrase "(HUNGAR! OR EAST! EUROPE!) AND DATE AFT 1989 AND
(DEMOCRAC! w/10 (CAPITALIS! OR FREE MARKET OR FREE ENTERPRISE OR
LAISSEZ FAIRE))." The search found 4,198 stories. There is no necessary connec-
tion between the two concepts either in theory or reality. "Not to worry, say the
multinational elites. From virtually all the organs of established opinion we hear
the mantra 'free-market capitalism and democratic institutions' as if the mere repe-
tition of this linkage might conjure up the fusion so desired. In Eastern Europe, the
White House and the International Monetary Fund insist, only 'economic reform' -
mass firings and draconian cuts in social services - can open the door to Western
aid.. . " Nelson Lichtenstein, Citizen Worker: The Experience of Workers in the
United States with Democracy and the Free Market During the Nineteenth Century,
258 NATION, No. 13, Apr. 4, 1994, at 459 (reviewing book of the same title by David
Montgomery). History generously demonstrates that capitalism flourishes in both
democratic and authoritarian political systems. Capitalist systems dominate North
America and Western Europe and Latin America, and are emerging throughout
Asia. Only in the first two areas have democratic institutions taken root along with
capitalism. Even in Western Europe and North America, democracy is not the result
of capitalist production relations, but has developed in spite of it. Capitalism is often
an anti-democratic way of organizing a society, because in all societies which have
undergone capitalist development, income inequality and the distribution of re-
sources within society become more polarized and the political process becomes cap-
tive to monied interests. It is only the intervention of the state (through democratic
processes) which puts the brakes on capital accumulation and the increasing immis-
eration of the majority of the population. Thus, in the United States, for example, as
capitalism reached a crisis in the 1930s, the state had to mandate wealth redistribu-
tion through legislation (Fair Labor Standards Act, Wagner Act, etc.) in order to
prevent the collapse of the capitalist economic structure. In Latin America and Asia,
where democratic institutions are far less powerful, income inequality is usually
greater than in North America and Western Europe. See generally SAMm AMIN,
MALDEVELOPMENT: ANATOMY OF A GLOBAL FAi~uRE (1990). See UNITED NATIONs DE-
VELOPMENT PRoGRAMME, supra note 182, and WORLD BANK, WORLD DEvELOPMENT
REPORT (1994) (for figures on income inequality).
255. Bryant, supra note 100, at 74.
256. AMSDEN ET AL., supra note 251, at 5.
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extinct when the socialist state collapses. Homo economicus, capi-
talism's self-interested rational actor, will replace the other, and
thereafter serve as the natural embodiment of human nature. To
this end, the state must be divorced from the economy, and to assist
in the transformation western investors should create or purchase
private or privatized firms, restructure them, and guide their poor
Eastern European cousins into the club of advanced capitalist coun-
tries in Western Europe. The West's burden is to contribute its su-
perior technology, management skills, work ethic, and capital to
help Eastern Europeans in the transition. Everybody wins in the
end.257
This is utopian nonsense. Homo sovieticus has not disap-
peared, and support for the right to employment, and economic
equality remains high in Eastern Europe, despite the disappear-
ance of the socialist state. There is nothing "artificial" about people
wanting to live in a society where everyone has a decent income and
economic security. There is no evidence, either, that homo
economicus is a more natural or desireable creature. Western cor-
porations and governments are playing a large role in the Eastern
European transition. Thus far, however, they have shown only
their interest in milking Eastern European economies by exploiting
cheap labor and new markets. The West has yet to demonstrate
any positive impact on the transition process.
The effects of the foregoing factors-western aid, the IMF, and
free market ideology-are to bind Hungary to the destructive path
of privatization and foreign investment. Thus, the economic policy
of the new socialist government is indistinguishable from that of
the center-right Democratic Forum coalition it replaced in the 1994
election.258 This in spite of the fact that the socialists won an over-
whelming majority in that election due to popular disgust with
rapid privatization and foreign investment.
257. This description of the conventional wisdom about development in Eastern
Europe is drawn generally from Bryant, supra note 100.
258. Hungary offers more favorable terms to prospective foreign investors than
other Eastern European countries, and continues to give foreigners a major role in
its modernization program. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text. The new
socialist government is also committed to continuing Hungary's privatization policy.
Prime Minister Horn made these guarantees at a "Financial Times" conference in
Budapest in late 1994. Premier and Finance Minister on Foreign Investment, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Nov. 16, 1994, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library,
CURNWS File. "[Socialist finance minister] Bekesi said Hungary would encourage
foreign investment by accelerating privatization of state banks and big utilities in
the power and telecommunications sectors." Michael Shields, Hungary to Start So-
cial Security Reforms in 1995, RxurEs, Nov. 14, 1994, available in NEXIS, NEWS




The huge gulf between government policy and the will of the
majority is evident from the socialist's plans to continue post-1989
privatization and foreign investment practices. Most people are
harmed by this practice and do not want it continued. On the other
hand, western institutions exert enormous influence on Hungarian
economic decision-making. The logical conclusion is that economic
decision-making in Hungary is more a function of the desires of
western governments and financial institutions than a function of
majoritarian desires within Hungary.2 59
IV. The Duration of Massive Inequality
Downward economic trends and inequality will continue into
the long-term future as capitalist social relations of production be-
come further entrenched through privatization and foreign invest-
ment and become embedded in the legal culture. This reality
contradicts the claims of elites (both Hungarian and Western) who
argue that the present suffering is a necessary transition preceding
the creation of a prosperous market economy in the future.260 The
dominant theory is that Eastern Europe is only behind the West
temporally, so success is just a matter of catching up with the
West.261 This theory is correct in the sense that enormous sacrifice
is needed to create a capitalist economy. A full-fledged market
economy will undoubtedly exist in the near future if Hungary con-
tinues to pursue its privatization program and other reforms of the
past five years. What is wrong about this neoclassical theory is its
259. See Woodward, supra note 150.
260. "All in all, the leading opinions maintained that through abolishing the rem-
nants of the state, a free market would automatically result within two to three
years in tangible growth and rising living standards." Bakos, supra note 17, at 1191.
Of course, what constitutes a "prosperous" or "successful" economy is an essentially
contested concept. Many economists measure success by reference to gross domestic
product, the strength of the currency, or stock market activity. Other economists
take measures of income inequality, homelessness, or infant mortality as indicative
of the health of an economy, and hence, a society. The latter criteria are largely
dismissed by neoclassical economists. See supra notes 232 and 234.
261. Traditional capitalist theory (and hence western economic development the-
ory) holds that private property is the basis for material well-being and political free-
doms. For the best and most famous articulation of this argument, see MILTON
FRIEDMAN, CAPrrALISM AND FREEDOM (1962). Friedman argues that private owner-
ship of property is the best way to organize society for production and guarantee
personal liberty, because rights to private property are a bulwark against the power
of the state. Post-1989 revolutionary reform in Eastern Europe has been largely
informed by the works of Friedman and Kornai (supra note 164). NovE, supra note
181, at 188. Under this view, every country in the world ought to be able to develop
successfully along the pattern established by Great Britain, continental Western Eu-
rope, and the United States. The only impediment to successful development is state
interference with production relations, which distorts "normal" economic activities
and infringes on private property rights, rights which are the basis of freedom.
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appraisal of the ultimate success of this system. It will exist, but
will not be successful, at least not for the majority of the population,
for whom the suffering caused by market reforms will have become
permanent. 26 2
The ideologues of capitalism say that Hungary can move "from
rags to riches" if Hungarians will only make sufficient sacri-
fices, if they will work hard and accept material deprivation to-
day as the cost of a radiant future tomorrow. The Hungarian
dream of upward mobility in the global order is bolstered by the
prevailing wisdom that Hungary's development was held back
by its communist past, so that shedding that past will automat-
ically bring development. This view simply fails to take into ac-
count the problems of late entry into a capitalist world
system.26 3
There are a variety of structural "late entry" problems opposing
Hungarian efforts to join the West.
First, capitalist development does not exist in a historical and
cultural vacuum. Eastern Europe is naively attempting to replicate
what it took Western Europe more than three hundred years to ac-
complish: the construction of reasonably successful market sys-
tems in which some amount of personal freedom and social welfare
coexist with the free market.26 4 But now these Western European
countries, with their progeny the United States, exert near hege-
monic control of the world economy. The wealthy countries of West-
ern Europe and North America dominate terms of trade and the
policies of the international lending institutions.2 6 5 In roughly the
last two decades, American hegemony has waned, and the hegem-
ony of free market principles per se is now what drives world eco-
262. This result was predicted by Samir Amin less than one year after the genesis
of Eastern European revolution. "A significant minority in the East - perhaps 20
percent - might benefit from the restoration of capitalism. But in light of the inade-
quate levels of development and international competitiveness achieved by the so-
cialist countries, this minority could never attain the Western standard of living that
fuels their aspirations without grinding down the mass of people." Samir Amin, The
Future of Socialism, MONTHLY REV. July 1990, Vol. 42, No. 3, at 10. See also KREGEL
ET AL., supra note 16, at 109-18 for a discussion of this idea:
The new rulers [in Eastern Europe] and their Western advisors appear
to impose the task of repeating the Great Transformation [the transi-
tion to capitalism in Western Europe] in a Big Leap Forward' on the
people in the former command economies. This time it is called 'Shock
Therapy' or 'Big Bang.' By 1992, the contention that the new Big Leap
Forward' will anew end in disaster has become certainty. The increas-
ing weaknesses of the economies to be transformed are now apparent.
In none of the transformation economies [has] the decline of production,
investment and employment... come to a halt or... been reversed.
Id. at 109.
263. BuRAwoy & LuKAcs, supra note 227, at 170-71.
264. See Waelde & Gunderson, supra note 18, at 347 and 349-55.
265. See generally AMIN, supra note 254.
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nomic relations.266 This creates an almost insurmountable
structural barrier to a late entry into the global economy.
Second, the neoclassical vision of economic development
(through privatization, price deregulation and foreign investment)
introduced to post-1989 Hungary is not a new idea. Before coming
to Eastern Europe, this strategy was applied in Latin America and
East Asia, with mostly disastrous results. Two countries' recent
histories demonstrate how privatization and foreign investment not
only magnify inequality, poverty and social tensions within socie-
ties, but also wreck long-term economic prospects.
Bolivia, under the tutelage of Harvard economist Jeffrey
Sachs, underwent drastic reforms in 1985 to control its hyperinfla-
tion. (Sachs became famous in 1990 as the architect of Poland's
"shock therapy" program.) Inflation was quickly brought under
control, and Bolivia also agreed to open its economy to foreign capi-
tal.267 After 1985, Bolivia privatized most of its economy and der-
egulated prices. As in Hungary, the IMF encouraged Boliva down
this development path.268 The lasting effects of "shock therapy" in
Bolivia have been disastrous. According to Mr. Sachs himself, "Bo-
livia used to be a miserably poor country suffering from hyperinfla-
tion and now it's a miserably poor country without inflation."269 In
1994, Bolivia was still the poorest country on the continent, and
income inequality had grown to extreme levels.270 Half the popula-
266. Id. This is all the more true after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in
1991. Now there is no real alternative to the expansion of capitalist production rela-
tions throughout the world. The sad experience of totalitarianism in the Soviet Bloc
is popularly understood as the failure of socialism. Thus, socialism today is largely
discredited as a viable economic system. Unfortunately, there is no existing or
emerging alternative to the "victorious" capitalist system as a way of organizing pro-
ductive forces in a society.
After the Soviet Union fell apart, "Eastern Europe's resources, land, and people
became additions to the area of third world exploitable territories. Members of the
Club of Seven now assume that they will indefinitely carry on the governance of
financial doings of the planet. Their hold on the world economy.., is unchallenged.
The issue of third world development for them means bringing those regions-per-
haps Eastern Europe as well-under the formulas of the multilateral lending agen-
cies [IMFI, increasing the austerity and hardship levels in order to reduce the
socially necessary cost of labor." Landau, supra note 119, at 29.
267. See Manana, LAT. AM. WEEKLY REP., May 16, 1986, at 7, available in NEXIS,
NEWS Library, ARCNWS File; Bolivia: Economy Becomes Completely Open to For-
eign Investment, EUROMONEY TREASURY MANAGER, Nov. 11, 1990, available in
NEXIS, NEWS Library, ARCNEWS File.
268. EUROMONEY TREASURY MANAGER, supra note 267.
269. Alexander Cockburn, Beat the Devil, NATION, Jan. 8, 1990, at 42.
270. WORLD BANK, supra note 254, at 220-21.
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tion lives in abject poverty,2 71 and the enormous class divisions
make civil insurrection a constant threat.272
Malaysia is another example of this process. After the IMF
imposed strict loan conditions in 1984,273 Malaysia completely reor-
ganized its economy to attract foreign investment. Like Hungary,
Malaysia passed laws giving foreign investors generous tax benefits
and guaranteeing them profit repatriation and currency ex-
change.274 Malaysia is now "extraordinarily dependant on foreign
companies" 2 75 and is the quintessential example of a foreign invest-
ment-led development strategy. Malaysia's economy has grown
markedly since embarking on this program. There have even been
some declines in poverty in recent years. 27 6 The World Bank has
been quick to congratulate itself on the "success" of this economic
development.2 7 7
What is usually forgotten in stories about Malaysia, however,
is the darker side of the foreign investment regime: in Malaysia
there is no minimum wage. 2 78 There are no enforceable workplace
health or safety laws.279 There are no enforceable labor laws.2 8 0
Workers (especially those employed by foreign-owned companies in
the huge electronics industry) are "continu[ally] subjected to a myr-
271. USA: Sachs Appeal - Simple Economic Solutions, EuROMONEY, Feb. 13,
1992, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, ARCNWS File.
272. Will Hutton, Selling the Capitalist Miracle, GuARDiAN, Mar. 2, 1992, at 21.
273. Donald Shoultz, Southeast Asia Nations Assail IMF Conditions, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 7, 1984, at 2.
274. Nancy Yoshihara, Malaysia Looks West to Attract Foreign Investment, LA.
TrmEs, Oct. 2, 1987, § 2, at 2. See also P. Prashanth, Malaysia: Why Foreign Inves-
tors Keep Coming, Inter Press Service, Apr. 3, 1990, available in NEXIS, NEWS
Library, ARCNWS File.
275. Anatole Kaletsky, A Way to Break the Dam, TuMEs (London), Mar. 4, 1994.
276. Lokman Mansor, Malaysia: Another RM200M to Help Hardcore Poor, Bus.
Tmss (Malaysia), Sept. 15, 1993, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS
File.
277. Id. Not everyone accepts the World Bank's story about foreign investment-
led poverty reduction in Malaysia, however. Martin Khor, of Malaysia's Third World
Network, calls the World Bank "one of the greatest promoters of poverty and envi-
ronmental destruction in the world." Brad Knickerbocker, Human Rights Versus De-
velopment, CHRIMrAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 25, 1992, at 15.
278. MALAYsIAN DEVELOPm:NT Au Hmorry, LABOR LAws mn MALAYsIA: A GUIDE
FOR IvEsToRs, Oct. 31, 1984. This is a violation of the international labor conven-
tion, which requires all countries to establish a minimum wage. See INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR OFFICE, M'neium WAGE FIxING CONvENTION (No. 131) of 1970, SummAus
OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS 47 (1989).
279. Amii Larkin Barnard, Labor Law in Malaysia: A Capitalist Device to Exploit
Third World Workers, LAw & POL'y INT'L Bus., Mar. 22, 1992, available in NEXIS,
NEWS Library, ARCNWS File.
280. Id. See also Lance Compa, Labor Rights and Labor Standards in Interna-
tional Trade, L. & POLY INT'L Bus., Sept. 22, 1993, at 65.
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iad of abuses" 281 and often work in the most deplorable condi-
tions.282 Women are frequently physically abused and raped while
at work.283 Foreign investors strictly forbid Malaysia's government
from improving working conditions, and threaten to take their fac-
tories elsewhere if workers are allowed to organize. 284 While abso-
lute poverty may have declined somewhat in Malaysia, the gap
between rich and poor is enormous, 285 and the country is a police
state.
These negative effects are generally the price to be paid for
relying on foreign investment as a route to development. Similarly,
Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea have all proven that eco-
nomic success is possible for developing nations-under highly op-
pressive conditions.28 6 Given the recent history of political freedom
under Soviet-dominated rule, it is doubtful that any Eastern Euro-
pean government will sacrifice its new-found democratic institu-
tions in order to mimic the authoritarian Asian development model.
Unfortunately, it may be impossible for any society to develop a suc-
cessful western-style capitalist economy without resorting to au-
thoritarian political rule.28 7
281. Barnard, supra note 279. See also World Workers Body Condemns Malaysia
at ILO, The Reuter Library Report, June 12, 1992, available in NEXIS, NEWS Li-
brary, ARCNWS File.
282. Barnard, supra note 279.
283. Id.
284. Russ Arensman, Malaysia Heads for Labor Showdown, ELEc. Bus., Sept.,
1990, at 45, 50. American companies have been the worst violators of workers'
rights in Malaysia. For example, in 1986, General Instrument Corporation told the
Malaysian Ministry of Labour that "if there is any union of any kind, it is quite likely
that GI corporate will sell this opto-electronic business, and it may mean closing the
off-shore plant in Malaysia." Id. at 47. American electronics firms ban union
brochures and pamphlets from the workplace. Kimori Mai, Malaysia's Workers -
Jolting the Electronics Industry, MULTNATIONAL MONITOR, Sept. 1989, at 11-12. Mo-
torola also told its employees that the company would relocate if a union was formed.
Id. at 11.
285. The ratio of income of the richest twenty percent of households to the poorest
twenty percent was 11.67 in 1989. The richest ten percent of households received
37.9% of all income. WoRLD DEVELOPMENT REPoirr, supra note 254, at 220-21.
286. See William Safire, Singapoverty, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 2, 1995 (critiquing this
type of development).
287. Full democracy cannot co-exist with radical economic reform. Economic re-
form is painful for the vast majority of the population, and if more people see them-
selves as losers in the transition process or in the new system than see themselves as
winners, economic reforms will be rejected in a functioning democracy. Thus, the
only way to accomplish radical reform which is painful for a majority of the popula-
tion is through authoritarian decision-making, which forces the population to accept
the economic reforms. This is the story of capitalist development among the "Little
Tigers" of Southeast Asia - Singapore, Taiwan, and Malaysia. The World Bank has
recently indicated that development under authoritarian conditions may be the only
way for poor countries to integrate into the global economy successfully. "Tolerance
of inequality is important in shaping attitudes toward reforms. The one value that
socialist systems have successfully inculcated is equality, and this value may under-
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Third, the neoclassical view dismisses the importance in eco-
nomic development of access to natural resources, assumes that
natural resources are not limited, and ignores the fact that some
countries hoard and/or squander these resources to the detriment of
other countries. 288 It is no surprise that the West has the biggest
slice of the resource pie. It has traditionally maintained its
superior position in the distribution of world resources through
colonialism (and concomitant resource extraction) and more re-
cently through neo- or economic colonialism. That is, since the
emergence of the capitalist system, the structure of world trade and
resource flows were at first enforced by the British navy, but after
World War II were enforced by the successor to the British navy,
the American-controlled Bretton Woods system 289 and, to a lessor
extent, the direct or theatened use of the American military and
coercion of foreign governments through foreign aid. Capitalist de-
velopment in Western Europe would probably not have occurred
successfully without the massive theft of labor and natural re-
sources from the Americas, Africa and Asia from the 16th to the
19th centuries. 290 Modern Eastern Europeans do not have this lux-
ury. Invading neighboring countries to expropriate resources from
them is obviously not a policy option for Hungary and other Eastern
European countries. 29 1 Thus, another ingredient of capitalist de-
velopment is missing.
A final impediment to "catching up" with the West is the fact
that the EC intentionally blocks the entry of Eastern European ex-
ports into EC markets. 292 When the Soviet Union disintegrated in
mine pro-market reforms under conditions of democracy." ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DE-
MOCRACY AND MARKET 178 (1991).
288. This is an incredible irony in liberal economic theory: human nature is pos-
ited as self-interested and acquisitive, and the aggregation of individuals into socie-
ties creates self-interested societies which compete for natural resources. Liberal
economic theory does not carry this assumption to its logical conclusion, however:
some self-interested countries will accumulate a grossly disproportionate share of
resources to the detriment of other self-interested countries. The obvious liability
upon economic development caused by a lack of resources is not generally considered
by liberal economists when applying their theories to Third World or Eastern Euro-
pean development.
289. See ROBERT GILPIN, TiE PoLrrcAL EcoNoMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
131-42 (1987).
290. This argument is explained in ERIc WOLF, EUROPE AND THE PEOPLE WrrHOUT
HISTORY (1982).
291. Note, however, that Russia can, and still does, get away with maintaining its
colonial empire through violent force. See Sonni Efron, Chechen Village Massacre by
Russians Cited, L.A. TdmEs, Apr. 14, 1995, at Al.
292. Lionel Barger, The New Hypocrites, INTVL ECONOMY, Sept./Oct. 1993, at 26.
See also The New Iron Curtain: Trade Barriers, Bus. WK, Nov. 7, 1994, at 63. "The
Iron Curtain has been replaced by an equally divisive wall of trade barriers between
Western and Central Europe. There are twenty anti-dumping measures imposed by
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1991, Hungary and other former Soviet bloc countries lost their big-
gest trading partner. They also partially lost the Council for Mu-
tual Economic Assistance (CMEA)293 trading structure that kept
some state enterprises going. The wealthy EC, which has officially
pledged its support to helping the region develop, has not helped
Eastern Europeans compensate for the loss of their traditional
CMEA markets by lowering EC trade barriers against products
from the East. The EC, in fact, has no real desire to help the former
Soviet bloc countries at all.294 The EC wants Eastern Europe to be
successful enough so that EC companies can profit from invest-
ments there, but not so successful that Eastern European products
will genuinely compete for market share in the West. For a variety
of reasons, then, while privatization and foreign investment-cen-
tered reform can speed economic growth, this route to the market
will not substantially improve most people's quality of life in East-
ern Europe.
V. Alternatives to the Present Course
The state socialist systems of Eastern Europe were clearly in
great need of reform.295 Unfortunately, the course of capitalist de-
velopment over the last five years has ignored the question of dis-
tributive justice,296 and has increasingly blocked democratic
the European Union in place. Central Europeans are shut out of German, Italian,
and French agriculture, steel, and textile markets." Id. See also Whitney, supra
note 5. "East European officials complain that when their companies can produce
goods more cheaply than Western competitors, West European governments protect
their industries by imposing tariffs or punitive quotas on the East Europeans." See
also ECONOMisT, supra note 146. "Meanwhile, western countries have been inexcus-
ably cautious in opening up to exports from the East." Id.
293. Regional trading organization set up by the Soviet Union in 1949 and im-
posed on the Soviet bloc countries of Eastern Europe as a way of increasing economic
specialization and economic interdependence. SCRUTON, supra note 11, at 75.
294. Barger, supra note 292.
295. State socialism produced some victories in terms of distributing material re-
sources to guarantee social welfare, but did so through an oppressive top-down cen-
tralized planning mechanism which disallowed democratic participation in the
economy. State socialism is completely bankrupt as an organizing principle and has
been rejected by majorities in every country in East Europe, including Hungary.
Most people prefer the old social welfare guarantees to the new free market poverty
and uncertainty, but almost no one wants to return to the oppressive dictatorial as-
pects of the state socialist system. A further catalyst for reform is the fact that the
old system was organized, both politically and economically, by the Soviet Union,
which no longer exists. Eastern European countries lost their biggest trading part-
ner in 1991, and cannot return to the old system which largely revolved around the
Soviet Union.
296. "[Ploverty, unemployment, inequality, social justice and the principles of
democratic governance have not been addressed effectively in the past five years and
... policies relating to those issues have not been integrated into economic policy and
structural reform." INTERNATIONAL LABouR OFFICE, EDITORIAL: UNEASY PATHS TO
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participation in economic decision-making as well.29 7 The post-
1989 transitional regime of privatization through massive foreign
investment is both counterproductive to the goal of sustainable eco-
nomic progress and out-of-sync with popular concepts of democracy
and justice. Hungarians, for example, value the economic elements
of democracy much more than its political elements.2 98 Every-
where in Eastern Europe "majorities define democracy in primarily
economic terms."299 Any alternative to the present course must
therefore concentrate on providing social welfare for all citizens.
This can only be accomplished through an active state sector.30 0
The current transformation process is failing, in large part, because
it has ignored this indigenous conception of democracy. Instead, it
has imposed a western-style free market economic and political sys-
tem onto Eastern European societies, 30 1 creating an artificial polit-
SOCIAL JUSTICE, NEWSLETrER, CENTRAL AND EASTERN EURoPEAN TEAM, Budapest,
June 1994, at 3.
297. See generally Daniel Singer, Ex-Communists and Rough Beasts, 259 NATION,
No. 16, Nov. 14, 1994, at 580. "What we have been watching in the past five years
throughout the East is a battle for power and property between privileged elites,
with the working people occasionally striking to defend their own immediate posi-
tion and at other moments being used as electoral fodder." Id.
298. This fact is unequivocally demonstrated by opinion polls in Hungary which
asked people to describe which thing is most important in a successful democracy.
Twenty-six percent said: "A government that guarantees that basic economic needs
of its people will be met." Nine percent said: "A government that guarantees eco-
nomic equality among its citizens." On the other hand, this survey found little sup-
port for the traditional western conception of political democracy, revealing that only
three percent believed that having "at least two strong political parties competing in
elections" was the most important thing in a democracy, and only two percent
thought that "freedom to criticize the government" was the most important thing.
Mary E. McIntosh & Martha Abele Mac Iver, Coping With Freedom and Uncertainty:
Public Opinion in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia 1989-1992, IN'L J. PUBLIC
OPINION RESEARCH, Winter 1992, at 375, 382. This data is from United States Infor-
mation Agency (USIA) surveys conducted in Eastern Europe from November 1991 to
January 1992. (The Hungarian survey questioned 999 adults and all surveys contain
a margin of error of four percentage points.) This strong support for the economic
meaning of democracy was found in every other country surveyed (the Czech Repub-
lic, Poland and Slovakia) as well. Id.
299. Id. at 387-88.
300. "Stemming poverty in this period of unprecedented structural change can
only be a public affair. There is no valid alternative to rising social expenditure
shares of GDP throughout the transition period." INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE,
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN TEAM, NEWSLE'rrER, STEMMING TIDES AND BuILD-
ING BRIDGES - SOCIAL PROTECTION DURING TRANSITION, Budapest, June, 1993, at 2.
301. Workers had no voice in economic decision-making during state socialism,
and they have none now, after five years of reform. Both actually existing socialism
and free market capitalism have failed to put into practice any notion of workplace
democracy. In 1956, two thousand Hungarian workers died over that issue, but now
that state socialism is finally gone, the spirit of that revolution has not returned. See
supra note 61 (discussing the origin of the 1956 uprising and its agenda). Instead, a
cheap and superficial form of "freedom" is emerging. This type of freedom limits
popular participation in decision-making to an election held every several years, in
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ical ethos that emphasizes values like voting,30 2 competition of
political parties,30 3 and free speech.304
The essential core, therefore, of successful reform in Eastern
Europe should be the institution of economic democracy, not just
political democracy.3 05 This goal must be put ahead of neoclassical
standards for measuring the health of an economy3 0 6 and a society.
The Hungarian government should, therefore, reevaluate its com-
mitment to foreign investment and privatization in light of these
policies' social welfare effects. Any reformulations of the reform
project must consider two broad issues with regard to privatization
and foreign investment. First, are either necessary?3 07 Second, if
they are, how should they be put into practice?
which the populace chooses which representatives of the upper-class (sometimes for-
mer socialists, sometimes former dissidents) will run the country until the next elec-
tion. The West heralds this "freedom" as proof of the superiority of its system. But
the freedom to speak, travel, vote-all of the West's political ethos-is empty rheto-
ric if economic development serves only the interests of the richest quarter of the
population.
302. The USIA data, supra note 297, confirmed that Hungarians do not perceive
the freedom to vote for candidates from competing parties as very important. Sev-
enty-three percent of respondents disagreed with the statement "Voting gives people
like me some say about how the government runs things." McIntosh, supra note
298, at 381.
303. Id. at 382.
304. Id.
305. See Standing, supra note 245, at 16.
306. Id. The classical liberal measures of economic success in developing coun-
tries are balance of payments, currency convertability, the level of autonomy of the
banking system, the level of private ownership of the means of production, the flexi-
bility of wages and prices. These factors are not really connected to the overall level
of human welfare in a country, and are certainly not connected to the distribution of
wealth therein. See also notes 232 and 234.
307. Of course, it is impossible to answer these questions without reference to a
goal for the economic structure of society. I explore these problems starting with the
assumption that any society with permanent and massive disparities in income
levels is undesireable. The question I frame here is thus "what type of economic
reform can be achieved without marginalizing large segments of the population?" I
assume that near-absolute income equality is not a goal worth pursuing because of
the obvious impossibility of redistributing wealth on regular basis. The goal I have
in mind, which underlies this discussion of alternatives to the present course, would
consider as a maximum tolerable amount of inequality a decile ratio of around 3, or
slightly higher than that achieved under state socialism. In other words, the aver-
age income of the top 10% of households should not be more than three times greater
than that of the bottom 10% of households. See supra note 182 for a discussion of the
decile ratio. This measure of inequality is meaningless, of course, if overall economic
conditions are so deplorable that most everyone is in poverty. Many western free-
market advocates decry the "shared poverty" of socialism. In Hungary, however,
this was never a reality. Under early state socialism Hungary experienced enor-
mous economic growth and living standards comparable to those of Austria and the
poorer OECD countries, such as Greece and Portugal. Societies which emphasize
economic equality do not have to exist in "shared poverty." Sweden is the obvious
example. Conversely, societies emphasizing individual opportunities are not neces-
sarily wealthy, and in fact, most capitalist countries are impoverished and have op-
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Under state socialism, even in liberal Hungary, the state
owned and operated the bulk of the economy, even enterprises as
small as comer grocery stores, coffee shops, and cinemas. This type
of micro-management of the country's economic life was an absurd
outgrowth of state socialism's official ideology. It seems clear that
some amount of private enterprise was an inevitable result of the
1989 revolutions. Small-scale privatization (and new business cre-
ation) occurred naturally after 1989, because of the relatively small
amounts of capital required. The creation of small new businesses
has somewhat offset the simultaneous rise in unemployment and
poverty. While it was an absurdity for the state to intervene at this
micro level, the "commanding heights" of the economy definitely
benefited from state ownership and direction throughout most of
socialism's forty year reign in Hungary.30 8 The question of owner-
ship and control of large-scale enterprises and industry was, and
remains, a very different problem than that of ownership of the cor-
ner grocery store. Even assuming that privatization was necessary
at the large-scale enterprise level, however, it could have been ef-
fected more incrementally, so as to mitigate the harm (in terms of
unemployment and poverty creation) due to sudden layoffs. The
state should have phased in restructurings, lay-offs and plant clos-
ings over a longer period, lessening the human costs of transition.
It also possible that Hungary may be unable to join the West
without substantial privatization through foreign investment. If
so, then, the creation of massive inequality and poverty is the price
to be paid for entry into the club of advanced capitalist countries.30 9
pressive political systems. Almost all of Latin America and parts of Asia are
examples of this condition.
308. State ownership created enormous economic growth in Hungary after World
War II. The command economy brought Hungary into the twentieth century and
significantly raised living standards. Hans-Magnus Enzenberger observed the fol-
lowing in Hungary in 1985:
Hardly anyone remembered that before the Second World War there
had been millions of agrarian proletarians in Hungary living below sub-
sistence level, without land or rights. Many emigrated to find salva-
tion; hundreds of thousands wound up as beggars. . . After bitter
conflicts and endless argument, the Kadar regime has definitely closed
the gap between town and country and made possible an agricultural
specialization that achieves large surpluses.... Hungarian socialism
has put an end to misery and servitude and achieved its most revolu-
tionary successes.
David Schweickart, Economic Democracy: A Worthy Socialism that Would Really
Work, 56:1 SCIENCE & SOC'Y 12 (Spring 1992).
309. It is also possible that poverty and social and economic inequality are to some
extent unavoidable under any development scenario. Of course, even if this is the
case, the economic policies chosen by the Hungarian government will either mitigate




Hungary, along with the Czech Republic and Poland, seems to be
set on the route to EC membership. The only question is whether
the social costs of this path to the free market will create social ten-
sions that cause the total collapse of the reform project, thereby also
destroying the liberal political project in these countries.310 Ultra-
rightist and nationalist movements may then form the next govern-
ments in much of Eastern Europe.
(a) Worker Ownership
The remaining state enterprises should either not be priva-
tized, or be privatized in a more democratic and redistributive man-
ners"1 through worker buy-outs or, as a last resort, by groups of
Hungarian investors.31 2 Both post-1989 Hungarian governments
have dismissed worker ownership as an option because western
governments and local elites share an ideology of reform opposed to
any type of collective ownership.313 But limited experience since
1989 reveals that worker ownership can be economically and so-
cially. successful in Hungary,314 and can avoid the more deleterious
310. McIntosh, supra note 298, at 388.
311. Standing, supra note 245, at 17. "[Tlhe process of privatisation offers the
great, and possibly fleeting, prospect of creating a new basis for redistributive justice
and economic democracy, and in the process providing one major source of income for
a citizenship income guarantee, without which 'social consensus' is likely to be a new
euphemism, describing a process by which a large mass of losers are policed in the
interest of the winners or perceived winners in the market economy." Id. at 16-17.
For examples of how this new euphemism works, see Lisa Pope, Riot Report Finds
Watts Similarities, HousToN CHRON., Oct. 23, 1992, at 20, and Carla Rivera, Riots'
Causes Same as in '60s, State Panel Says, L.A. TuMs, Oct. 2, 1992, at Al.
312. This latter suggestion (Hungarian investors) solves only half of the problem,
however. It keeps more profits in the country, thus slowing decapitalization, but
does not mitigate growing income inequality within Hungary itself.
313. Maurice Glasman, The Great Deformation: Polanyi, Poland, and the Terrors
of Planned Spontaneity, at 203-06 (cited by Bryant, supra note 100). See also
BuRAwoy & LuKAcs, supra note 227, at 23. Some workers also initially rejected the
idea of worker ownership because they associated it with the old state socialist ideol-
ogy. Even Lech Walesa sold-out the Solidarity agenda of 1979-1980 (which de-
manded worker democracy) in favor of IMF-inspired "shock therapy" (which rejected
worker democracy). Glasman, at 206. Worker ownership has nothing at all to do
with state socialism, and emphasizes a de-centralized economy rather than a cen-
tralized one. There is a law providing for employee buy-outs of state enterprises (Act
XLIV of 1992). It has not resulted in much growth of worker owned firms, however,
because the government favors foreign investment.
314. See generally Robert Wisner, A Socialist Shortcut to Capitalism? The Role of
Worker Ownership in Eastern Europe's Mass Privatizations, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 123, 129 (1993). In 1993, Hungary successfully sold the country's oldest
continuously operating factory, the Herend Porcelain Manufacturing Company, to
its 1,500 employees. Judith Ingram, Capitalism is Cast in Hungarian Porcelain,
N.Y. Tnmas, July 10, 1993, at 41. The workers' decided to buy Herend and run it
themselves to stop management's plan to enter a joint venture with a foreign inves-
tor. BuRAwoY & LuKAcs, supra note 227, at 164-65.
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effects of the current privatization through foreign investment
strategy.3 15 The sale of state enterprises to workers is a radically
different type of privatization.3 16 Worker ownership offers many
advantages over traditional capitalist investor-ownership created
through privatization and sales to foreigners.
First, the income distribution produced by cooperative owner-
ship is more egalitarian.3 17 In fact, worker ownership "may be the
only means of realizing a relatively equitable society."318 Worker
ownership may thus mitigate the growth of inequality in the transi-
tion process. 3 19 This is because workers typically elect the firm's
management, and the median voters are blue-collar workers. When
wages are determined democratically, therefore, there is less dis-
parity between the top and bottom pay scales. The level of income
equality both within firms and throughout society is important be-
cause income distribution is still a salient value in Hungarian
society.3 2 0
Second, because labor productivity is related to equity in the
firm's internal pay schedule,32 1 worker ownership is likely to in-
crease this labor productivity. People work harder if they believe
that their wages are more a function of the amount of work they do
than a function of their rank in the firm's managerial hierarchy. 3 22
This is especially true in the Eastern European transition econo-
mies.32 3 Further, worker ownership does not harm productivity or
growth, at least not any more than does capitalist corporate owner-
315. Wisner, supra note 314, at 123. My analysis of the feasability and desirabil-
ity of worker ownership in Hungary is drawn primarily from this work.
316. Id. at 124.
317. Saul Estrin, Some Reflections on Self-Management, Social Choice, and Re-
form in Eastern Europe, 15 J. ComP. EcoN. 349, 356 (1991). A recent study of wages
and salaries in the Italian cooperative sector revealed that the ratio of managers'
pay to unskilled workers' pay was only 1.67. In the privately owned sector, this ratio
was 2.86. Id. at 357.
318. Wisner, supra note 314, at 141. The adverse effects of restructuring (layoffs,
decreasing wages, loss of job security) would probably be suffered more gradually
under a worker-ownership scheme, giving displaced workers time to plan for the
future and retrain or find other employment.
319. Id. Traditional investor ownership in a capitalist economy does not promote
egalitarian income distributions because "corporations plan for their own benefit, for
their own profit at the expense of whoever bears the cost." William Dugger, Demo-
cratic Economic Planning and Worker Ownership, 21 J. ECON. IssUEs 87, 93 (1987).
320. See McIntosh, supra note 298. Hungarians support need-based or equitable
pay scales both in absolute terms and relative to the West. Id.
321. Estrin, supra note 317, at 359.
322. Witztum, supra note 186, at 98.
323. Id. at 97-98.
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ship.324 Worker owned firms probably also have some important
efficiency advantages over investor-owned firms.3 25
Third, worker participation in tough economic decisions miti-
gates dissatisfaction with economic hardships and strengthens
political stability. No matter how economic reform proceeds in
Eastern Europe, some tough times are ahead for at least the near
future. Difficult allocative economic decisions (layoffs and wage de-
creases, for example) are often required in firms, but the workforce
accepts these decisions as more legitimate when workers them-
selves have a hand in making those decisions. This legitimacy will
further the development of social and political stability, because
most frustration at the government now is due to the perceived ar-
bitrary and unjust distribution of economic hardship.326 A related
point is that the development of democracy in Eastern Europe may
be frustrated without worker-ownership.3 2 7
Fourth, because workers share the profits of worker-owned
firms, they have an interest in effectively monitoring each other
and their management.: This monitoring enhances economic per-
formance. Worker ownership "may therefore also offer some disci-
pline of management when private capital markets are weak,"32 8 as
they are in Hungary.
Fifth, the relative absence of strikes and labor disputes in
worker-owned firms increases efficiency and productivity both at
324. Estrin, supra note 317, at 352. See also Avner Ben-Ner and Derek C. Jones,
The Productivity Effects of Employee Participation in Control and in Economic Re-
turns: A Review of the Literature and Some Policy Implication for Emerging Market
Economies, in Working Paper (Industrial Relations Center, University of Minnesota,
and Department of Economics, Hamilton College).
325. Henry Hansmann, Worker Participation and Corporate Governance, 43 U. oF
ToRONTo L. J. 589, 595 (1993). "Profit-sharing incentives, mutual and delegated
monitoring, better training, and less alienating work - these factors all tend to en-
hance workers' effort and dedication, so much so that it is likely that LM [labor-
managed] firms are in fact more X-efficient [internally efficient] than CM [capital-
managed] firms; that is, they can achieve higher productivity with lower supervisory
costs and higher worker satisfaction." Marc Fleurbaey, An Egalitarian Democratic
Private Ownership Economy, 21 POL. & Soc'Y 215, 220 (1993). There is also evidence
that movement toward greater equality in society as a whole leads to economic
growth superior to that produced by societies with greater disparities in income.
This contradicts the traditional neo-classical assumption of an "equality-efficiency
trade-off." David Gordon et al., An Equality-Efficiency Trade-off?, DISSENT, Fall
1990, at 510-12.
326. Id. at 354.
327. Owen Fiss, Capitalism and Democracy, 13 McH. J. INTL L. 908, 917 (1992).
"After laboring in a hierarchically organized workplace for eight hours, without any
real say in the structure or performance of his or her tasks, the citizen is unlikely to
have, or be inclined to exercise, the independence of judgment and critical acuity
essential to democratic politics." Id.
328. Id.
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the firm level and in the economy at large.3 29 This is particularly
important in Eastern Europe, which witnessed the devastating ef-
fects of labor disputes in the Polish economy after the Mazowiecki
government introduced massive "shock therapy" privatization and
deregulation in 1990.330 Violent labor unrest due to market re-
forms is also a recurring event in the Romanian mining indus-
try.3 3 1 Hungary has not experienced large-scale labor unrest after
1989, but the potential for it is clear as workers become increas-
ingly embittered by unemployment and declining real wages. A
taxi drivers strike in Budapest in 1990 showed that concerted ac-
tion by only a few hundred people could almost completely shut
down the city's economic life.332
Finally, creating a democratic economy based on worker own-
ership is manifestly feasible in Eastern Europe because the law of
property rights is still unsettled. There is a unique opportunity to
draft laws that promote conceptions of property conducive to
worker ownership and the creation of a more egalitarian economy.
Conversely, worker ownership in the West has faced difficult barri-
ers because there it is difficult to "unbundle"33 3 entrenched legal
concepts of property to create the conditions in which worker owned
firms can prosper.334
There are two main criticisms raised against worker owned
firms. One criticism is specific to the Eastern European transition
economies. If Hungary is going to join the West and compete in a
world market, some modernization and restructuring is necessary.
Worker owned firms, however, do not have the capital to restruc-
ture and modernize factories to put production on a level capable of
competing with the West. Opponents of worker ownership argue
that privatization without foreign investors is thus impossible be-
329. Estrin, supra note 317, at 360. See also Will Bartlett et al., Labor-Managed
Cooperatives and Private Firms in North Central Italy: An Empirical Comparison,
INDus. & LABOR REL. REv. (1992), at 116.
330. See JeffMadrick, Poland's 'Big Bang: Too Much Too Fast?, N.Y. T3mEs, May
20, 1990, at 13.
331. See Roxana Dasculu, Romanian Government Faces Winter of Strikes, REurER
Eu. Bus. REP., Nov. 16, 1992, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, ARCNWS File.
332. Cab and truck drivers protesting a dramatic rise in gasoline prices com-
pletely blockaded all six road bridges crossing the Danube River in Budapest for
three days in October 1990. The government was forced to back down and partially
rescinded the price increase. See Carol Williams, Hungary Forced to Pull Back on
Huge Gas Price Boost: Taxi Drivers, Truckers Agree to Suspend a Crippling Block-
ade, L-. TamEs, Oct. 29, 1990.
333. Dugger, supra note 319, at 95-97. Property rights are not an indivisible en-
tity. They can be unbundled and "reallocated or rescinded entirely. Unbundleing
can penetrate into the very heart of corporate capitalism and reallocate rights to
workers and to democratic planners in an orderly fashion." Id. at 97.
334. Id. at 95-97.
1995] 365
Law and Inequality
cause Hungarians have only a small share of the capital needed to
buy-out and restructure all the enterprises the state wants to sell.
This argument is at least partially correct,3 3 5 but usually over-
stated, and wrongly concludes that state enterprises had to be sold
for cash to foreign investors. State enterprises could have been
given to workers, or sold to them at deep discounts, or sold to for-
eign investors as minority stockholders. Also, many state enter-
prises were already profitable and needed no restructuring to
compete in western markets. The claim that state owned enter-
prises were so inefficient that they would all immediately fold with-
out massive upgrading is simply false. About one-third of the
Hungarian state sector was profitable and could have been priva-
tized through worker ownership without any foreign investment
whatsoever. Unfortunately, almost all these profitable firms were
sold to foreign investors. The remaining state owned firms which
need restructuring to compete in the West can raise only limited
amounts of capital from Hungarian investors. To the extent that
international financial institutions are unwilling to lend money to
workers, the state should maintain public control over private in-
vestments by requiring the Hungarian banking system to finance
worker buy-outs.336 This is not a return to the old state socialist
planning mechanism, but a way of making ownership transition
feasible. It is hard to imagine that the effects of this could be much
worse than the aforementioned long-term disadvantages of foreign
control of the economy. If anything, this proposal would give new
worker-controlled firms several years to emerge, restructure their
enterprises, and prove themselves, rather than providing them
with a continuous subsidy, as under state socialism.
The other major criticism is one raised against worker owner-
ship everywhere: workers, even when they do possess sufficient
capital, will refuse to invest it in the firms they own because they
themselves may not see the benefits of that investment in their own
lifetimes.3 37 Thus, the investment time horizon of worker owned
firms is extremely narrow and lack of investment causes these
firms to become inefficient and outmoded.
335. Total Hungarian savings were only around two billion dollars in 1990, but
the value of state assets the government wished to privatize at that time was around
30 billion dollars. David Fairlamb, Eastern Europe: Grow Your Own Institutional
Investors, INsTrrToNAL INVESTOR (Reuter Textline), Aug. 31, 1990, available in
NEXIS, WORLD Library, ALLWLD File.
336. See generally Fleurbaey, supra note 325.
337. Jensen & Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An Application to La-
bor-Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. Bus. 469 (1979).
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This is an empirically baseless attack which the western press
and mainstream opinion has echoed for years.338 The experience of
worker owned firms clearly refutes this criticism. An empirical
study of Italian firms, for example, showed that "there was virtually
no difference between cooperatives and private firms in the time
period over which investments were evaluated."339 Similarly,
worker owned firms have prospered for decades without this under-
investment problem.340 There are examples of successful worker-
owned firms in France, Israel, Italy, Spain, and Sweden that can
serve as models for Eastern European development along this
path.341 Also, because the median worker will stay with a firm for
fifteen or twenty years, the firm's time horizon is probably not that
low after all.342 An investment horizon of fifteen years is actually
longer than that of most traditional investor-owned flrms. 3 43
(b) Regional Trade
Second, the countries of Eastern Europe should expand their
regional trading arrangements. The Visegrad Treaty3 44 of 1992
strengthened economic cooperation among the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, but has not gone far enough in pro-
moting regional cooperation. Since 1989, the countries of Eastern
Europe "have been locked in a battle to lure the biggest foreign in-
vestments.. . "345 That is, the competition for foreign investment
creates a kind of race to the bottom in terms of tax holidays, lower
wages and other concessions to foreign companies. This competi-
tion discourages true economic development, frustrates workers'
338. "For example, virtually every article on employee ownership ever published
in an American law review cites the classic article by Jensen and Meckling... which
'proves' that labor-managed businesses would be so inefficient that no investor would
ever lend money to them." Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership, 67 Cm.-
KENT L. REV. 159, 175 (1991). If anyone ought to understand the benefits of worker
ownership, it is American lawyers, who commonly organize themselves in worker-
owned firms. All of the professional classes seem to favor worker ownership for
themselves, while claiming it will not be practical for blue-collar or unskilled
workers.
339. Bartlett, supra note 329, at 112.
340. See generally Hansmann, supra note 325.
341. Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms,
Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YAiL L.J. 1749, 1759. "[T]here are
in fact a great many successful, long-lived, employee-owned and managed firms in
the United States and elsewhere. These firms have survived without government
subsidy, often in hostile environments." Hyde, supra note 336, at 168.
342. Hansmann, supra note 341, at 1774.
343. Id.
344. See generally Andras Inotai & Magdolna Sass, Economic Integration of the
Visegrad Countries, E. EuR. ECON., NovlDec. 1994, at 6.
345. Laura Zelenko Bloomberg, Competition vs. Cooperation in Eastern Europe,
FiN. PosT, Mar. 1, 1995, at 45.
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rights, and depresses wages, all of which will harm the countries of
Eastern Europe into the long-term future. Hungary must, there-
fore, encourage the development of regional agreements regulating
the terms of foreign investments. This might allow Eastern
Europeans to strengthen their bargaining positions en banc against
Western investors, and demand fair prices and decent working con-
ditions from western owned firms.
Related to this is foreign trade. Hungary and its neighbors
should develop their own trading arrangements to prevent the EC
from exploiting them individually.346 This would benefit Eastern
Europe as a whole and decrease reliance on trade with Western Eu-
rope, thereby reducing the amount of economic coercion Western
Europeans can apply in the East.
Conclusion
This article has attempted to analyze the post-1989 free mar-
ket revolution in Hungary, focusing on the human costs of this pro-
cess. The dominant events in this historically unique market
transition are privatization and foreign investment. These two
events are important both as practices and as ideologies. In prac-
tice, market reform over the course of the past five years has been a
monumental disaster in terms of its impact on social welfare. As
ideology, these ideas have inhibited the development of a more
democratic and egalitarian version of economic transformation.
Although economic reform was necessary following state so-
cialism's collapse, identifiable factors have prevented a deliberate
and gradual reform that could have mitigated at least the more out-
rageous suffering visited upon large numbers of people in Hungary
and elsewhere in the region. Western aid and international finan-
cial institutions have perpetuated ideologically-based reforms and
aggravated the harms resulting from this economic transformation.
Future reform efforts should take more seriously the human costs
necessarily implicated in an economic reform program. In the long-
run, even the political democracy established after the revolutions
in Hungary and in the rest of Eastern Europe will be threatened if
today's patterns of inequality continue into the future.
346. 'he non-aligned nations have not utilized their collective potential to bar-
gain for a more just system and instead have capitulated individually to the great
enforcers of third world 'free enterprise:' the International Monetary Fund [IMF]
and the World Bank." Landau, supra note 119, at 29. Hungary signed the the Cen-
tral European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) in December, 1992, and ratified it in
September, 1993. Hungarian Parliament Ratifies Central European Free Trade
Agreement, Agence France Presse, Sept. 8, 1993, available in NEXIS, NEWS Li-
brary, CURNWS File. CEFTA will gradually dismantle trade barriers among East-
ern European countries. The CEFTA was signed by all the Visegrad countries. Id.
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